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OIL & GAS LITIGATION:
WHAT USUALLY GOES WRONG AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT IT
I.

SCOPE OF ARTICLE
This article analyzes several of the common disputes that arise in the exploration,

development, and operation of an oil and gas prospect. The article will also analyze the recent cases
as to the admissibility o f expert testimony in disputes arising from the exploration, development, and
operation of oil and gas prospects.

II.

EXPLORATION AND SURFACE USER DISPUTES
This section will focus on the disputes arising from exploration agreements and surface user.

A.

Promotion and Sale of the Prospect
1.

Confidentiality Agreements

Disputes often arise with regard to the alleged confidentiality o f geologic and engineering
data shown to prospective buyers of the prospect. Often, the originating exploration geologist
reviews various publicly available data and formulates various geologic concepts in his prospective
area of interest. The geologist then begins to market his geologic concepts. The geologist may,
however, refine those geologic concepts to specific prospects and then market those specific
prospects. The originating geologist almost always requires a confidentiality agreement executed
by all prospective purchasers of the concept or prospect before the geologist will show the prospect.
The prospective purchaser, of course, must study the prospect, analyze the prospect, and determine
whether, or not, the prospect is sound and fits the purchaser’s exploration program. Conversely, the
geologist wishes to be protected in the event the prospective purchaser does not purchase the
prospect, or if the prospect is purchased, the Purchaser does not develop the prospect. It is very
important for the parties to promptly document the confidentiality agreement to accurately establish
the area of mutual interest, the parties’ respective rights within the area o f mutual interest, and any
1

consideration to be paid the geologist in the event the prospect is developed. Generally, if the
prospective purchaser buys the prospect, the purchaser will pay the geologist cash consideration plus
some specified overriding royalty interest in the prospect. Unfortunately, many o f the confidentiality
agreements routinely used are “fill in the blank” form agreements, generated by, and altered by, nonlawyers. Thus, multi-million dollar potential liability is often governed by poorly thought out and
poorly drafted agreements.

a.

Real Life Dispute as to a Confidentiality Agreement

In this dispute, a geologist (“Geologist”) drafts his own form o f confidentiality agreement,
which covers a very large area of interest. Under the agreement, the purchaser (“Purchaser”) agrees
to a cash payment for the geologic idea and agrees to grant the Geologist an override in any oil, gas
and mineral leases, acquired by the Purchaser within the area of interest (“A 1”). The Purchaser, in
furtherance o f the development with the project, shows the prospect it purchased to another company
actively competing in the area of interest. The competing company (“Competing Company”), the
Purchaser, and the Geologist meet to discuss an exploration agreement as to an area of interest
(“A2”) which is a much smaller area of interest than described in the confidentiality agreement but
is contained within the larger A l. (See Figure 1),

Figure 1
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The parties enter an exploration agreement for the development of A2, shoot 3-D seismic, and based
upon such seismic, drill several wells, some o f which are producers. The Competing Company,
based upon its own geology and the development of the wells in A2, decides to develop additional
wells on its own on leases not located in A2, but which leases are within the original A l. The
Competing Company is not subject to the original confidentiality agreement between Geologist and
Purchaser. The Competing Company then drills several highly successful wells on leases it acquired,
which are not in A2, but are within A l. The Geologist has no contractual relationship with the
Competing Company that would grant him an interest in the wells drilled by the Competing
Company outside of A2 but within A l. The Geologist then sues the purchaser, claiming that the
Purchaser requests the Geologist show the Competing Company all o f the information with regard
to the larger A l and that based upon this information, the Competing Company decided to take
leases in the area. Thus, the Geologist is suing the Purchaser o f the prospect for damages in the
amount o f the overriding royalty interest the Geologist claims he should have had in the wells - even
though the Purchaser did not participate, and owns no interest in, the wells. The Geologist contends
that the Purchaser breached the confidentiality agreement by allowing the Geologist to show all of
his geologic information with respect to A l to the Competing Company.

b.

Actions to Prevent Dispute

The following actions would be helpful in preventing the above-described type
confidentiality agreement dispute:
i.

carefully review, and consider, the legal effect o f the proposed form o f confidentiality

agreement - do not just “fill in the blanks” on an old form without having someone with legal
training review the agreement to make sure it fits the deal. On large areas o f interest, or the “big
deal,” carefully craft the agreement.
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ii.

before the geologic information is shown to the Competing Company, require that

the Competing Company execute a confidentiality agreement that has an area o f interest co-extensive
with the area of interest between the Geologist and Purchaser.
iii.

if the Competing Company will not agree to a confidentiality agreement with a

sufficiently large area of interest, limit the geologic data shown to the specific smaller area of
interest. Also, at all meetings, document the description o f the data shown and have the Geologist,
Purchaser and Competing Company sign such documentation agreeing as to what data was shown
and that each party agree to show the data. At each meeting, the parties should circulate a form
identifying the name, address and party represented, for each attendee o f each meeting.
iv.

if the Purchaser has the Geologist show the prospect, the Purchaser should, in writing,

specifically instruct the Geologist to show only the confidential data from the area o f interest
contained in the confidentiality agreement with the Competing Company.

2.

Exploration Agreement Disputes as to the Nature of, and Extent of, the
Project to be Undertaken

Another fertile area for disputes arise with respect to the exploration agreement covering the
project.
In large acreage plays, disputes under the exploration agreement often arise as to the selection
o f drilling prospects, the specific nature o f the work to be performed and the horizons to be tested
and the manner o f testing, and very importantly, the prompt payment for each participant’s share of
the cost o f that development.
Under exploration agreements, prospects are generally identified and often there is some
general discussion as to the order of development of the prospects. However, many form exploration
agreements are not nearly specific enough as to the identification o f specific drilling prospects, or
the mechanism to select the order of such prospects in the event the parties cannot agree on the order
4

of drilling prospects. Also, often the exploration agreement does not specify the minimum depth,
or specific horizons, to be targeted in the drilling o f a given prospect. In addition, very often
exploration agreements do not have specific, self-enforcing, provisions for the failure o f a participant
to timely pay its share of exploration and development costs.

a.

Selection and Ordering of the Exploration Activity

Seismic, or other, exploration activity will generally precede drilling o f specific prospects.
However, if the area covered by the exploration agreement is large - say, a multi-thousand acre
block, the entire block may not warrant shooting, and the order o f shooting, and subsequent
development should be specified, to the extent possible, in the exploration agreement. More
importantly, when the participants are of unequal financial ability, the maximum number o f
exploration and development activities that can be pursued at any given time should be specified;
otherwise, the more prosperous participants can propose multiple, short-term, consecutive
developments, and thereby, drill the less prosperous participants out o f the project. Also, the
exploration agreement should be very specific as to who can propose a prospect, and the minimum
depth, or target horizons that should be drilled and tested in each prospect. Otherwise, there is a
possibility of a race to designate drilling prospects, and the less prosperous participants may
designate shallow tests in a prospect, so as, to earn their interest in that prospect with the minimum
expenditure.

b.

Timely Payment for Exploration and Development

Timely payment by each participant is critical for the proper and the efficient development
of the exploration project - especially large projects. Great care, therefore, should be taken in the
drafting o f the exploration agreement to include the following:

5

i.

The form of notice for election to participate in leasing of additional acreage in areas

of interest which includes not only a time limit to elect to acquire an interest in such new leases, but
also establishes a specific deadline for payment to acquire such interest.
ii.

Specific clauses in the exploration agreement as to the consequences o f failing to

timely pay an invoice, including specific forfeiture provisions as to the non-paying participants’
interest in the specific prospect, or as to the entire project. Although the exploration agreement
generally has an attached joint operating agreement which is made part o f the exploration agreement,
the parties should expressly provide for payment and forfeiture provisions in the exploration
agreement specifically as to the seismic and other general and administrative exploration expenses.
Otherwise, non-paying participants may contend that the forfeiture provisions o f the joint operating
agreement only apply as to the drilling and operation expenses in respect o f specific drilling
prospects and do not apply to seismic and general and administrative exploration expenses. Thus,
all forfeiture provisions and penalty provisions for late, or non-payment, of seismic, general and
administrative expenses should be written into the exploration agreement.

3.

Real Life Dispute as to Exploration Agreement and the Joint Operating
Agreement as to the Exploration and Development of a Large Acreage
Block

Two parties undertook the exploration and development o f a 50,000-acre tract for the
development of a deep 15,000 feet gas play (“Deep Gas”). In addition there were other shallower
formations of interest (“Shallow Gas”). One participant was very strong financially (“Big Oil”), and
the other participant was weak financially (“Little Oil”). Big Oil was the operator and, while both
parties had spent several million dollars in acquiring certain o f the base leases, many additional
leases needed to be acquired in the project. Also, the parties needed to shoot several large 3-D
surveys over the project. Big Oil promptly began acquiring large blocks o f leases, and began
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contracting for the large and expensive seismic surveys on the project. As Big Oil would acquire
a lease, it would invoice Little Oil for its share - sometimes, according to the notice provision of the
exploration agreement, but often by including those lease expenses in the monthly joint interest
billing. Little Oil fell behind on its payments, Big Oil grew tired of carrying Little Oil, and invoked
the forfeiture provisions for untimely payment contained in the joint operating agreement which was,
by reference, made a part o f the exploration agreement. Little Oil contended, o f course, that the
forfeiture provision in the joint operating agreement, adopted by reference in the exploration
agreement, did not apply to lease acquisition expenses or seismic expenses. A lawsuit ensued.
After the lawsuit had been joined, the participants had a drilling obligation for a deep test,
and Little Oil consented to the drilling; however, it did not pay its share o f the drilling costs. Big
Oil, then determined to designate as many drilling prospects in the project as was allowed under the
exploration agreement, to drill non-paying Little Oil out of the project. But, to prevent being drilled
out of the project, Little Oil designated the drilling o f a shallow well on a large prospect. The
shallow well was not in an optimum location to test the Deep Gas, and, in addition, the engineering
requirements for drilling to the Deep Gas made it impossible to use the wellbore o f the proposed
shallow gas well to drill out and deepen it to the Deep Gas. Meanwhile, other competitors were
entering the area, requiring Big Oil to continue to acquire leases, to shoot seismic data, and to drill
very deep and expensive wells without any payments from the financially strapped Little Oil. The
development o f the large prospect was, therefore, in jeopardy o f floundering. Fortunately, the parties
were able to settle this exploration and development nightmare but only after very expensive pretrial
practice.
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B.

Seismic Trespass and Seismic Data Disputes

The mineral estate has the right to conduct geophysical operations, or the right to grant others
the right to conduct geophysical operations. Wilson v. Texas Co., 237 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Ft. Worth 1951, writ re f 'd n.r.e.); and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F. 2d 586, 590
(5th Cir. 1957). Further, most oil and gas leases grant the lessee the specific and exclusive right to
conduct geophysical and seismic operations on the lease premises. Occasionally, however, disputes
arise as to those leases that are not clear as to whether, or not, the lessee’s right to conduct
geophysical and seismic operations are exclusive to the lessee. See, Wilson v. Texas Co., supra. If
the lease is not specific in granting the lessee the exclusive right for geophysical operations, then,
disputes may arise from a lessor who grants, or seeks to grant, seismic exploration privileges on the
leased premises to some third party, or the lessor may attempt to prevent his lessee from geophysical
seismic exploration without payment of additional consideration. Accord, Enron Oil & Gas Co. v.

Worth, 947 P.2nd 610, 613 (Ct. App. Okla.). (Lessor and lessee both had the right to conduct
geophysical exploration since the lease did not grant the exclusive right to the lessee.)

C.

Joint Mineral Owners’ Rights With Respect to Granting Seismic Permits

In the event there are joint owners in the mineral estate, the question arises as to whether or
not all such mineral owners must be joined in any permit to shoot seismic on the jointly owned tract.
Many tracts have joint mineral ownership, such that, it is often a difficult and a time consuming task
to determine precise ownership of the tract and to find and take permits from each owner. The
question, then, is: Can one, or more, o f the joint owners properly allow shooting o f seismic on the
tract? There are few cases on point, and the commentators are not unanimous in their analysis o f this
question. W alker, Pit Falls in Shooting- Options and Section-Leases, 1 Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Institute, 23 9,249-50 (1955). As a practical matter, most seismic contractors will shoot seismic
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if an undivided mineral interest owner will grant the necessary permits to conduct geophysical
operations - even if the other mineral interest owners do not join. Earl A. Brown, Jr., Geophysical

Trespass, 3 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute, 57, 59-60 (1957); and Dancy and Humphries,
Legal Considerations Involved in the Geophysical Exploration o f Oil and Gas, 57 Okla. B. J. 1802,
1805 (1986). As a practical matter, permits should be taken from as many joint owners as possible.
If there are major mineral interest owners unpermitted, they will almost certainly object to the survey
and may litigate to prevent the survey. See, Jones and Faber, Subservice Trespass and Seismic

Options, 11th Annual Advanced Oil, Gas and Mineral Law Course, J-l (1993).
1.

Seismic Options

It can be argued that, since a joint mineral owner is entitled to develop the mineral estate as
a “co-tenant”, a joint mineral owner should be allowed to permit a seismic survey as to the jointly
owned tract. That analogy, however, is not altogether accurate. Rather, the seismic permit is more
in the nature o f the granting of an easement on the property, and in most jurisdictions, including
Texas, one co-tenant cannot grant an easement across the common estate without the consent of the
other co-tenants. Texas Mortgage Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 470 F.2d 497,499 (5th Cir. 1972)
(interpreting Texas law). See also, Bloomquist, 48 Baylor L. Rev. 21, 36 (1996). At least one
Oklahoma court has held that an undivided mineral interest owner, as tenant in common with respect
to the mineral estate, has a right to grant a permit to conduct geophysical operations on the tract
without the joinder of the other mineral owners o f the tract. Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Worth, supra.
In the event that seismic operations are conducted without joinder o f all mineral interest
owners on the tract, and the subsequent seismic operations condemn the tract as valueless, the
mineral interest owners that were not permitted may very likely pursue a cause o f action for
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geophysical trespass for damages in the amount of the diminution o f the value of their mineral estate.

2.

Geophysical Options

Although certain speculative 3-D shoots are commissioned on the basis of permits, most 3-D
seismic shoots are now shot pursuant to seismic option agreements. Under these agreements, the
exploration company options the acreage for a given period o f time to conduct seismic operations,
and then has the option to lease the acreage on the bonus, rental, royalty, and other terms specified
in the seismic option agreement. The exploration company is, therefore, motivated to find and
attempt to option all of the interest in the given tract. Otherwise, the exploration company that is not
careful to lease all interests in a given tract, may prove up the oil and gas potential o f that tract with
an expensive 3-D seismic shoot and then have to attempt to take a lease from a mineral owner who
likely knows of the 3-D shoot and will likely insist upon a large lease bonus and royalty interest. The
seismic option in its terms and effect is more closely analogous to the development o f the tract by
a co-tenant and, therefore, arguably does not require the joinder o f all other co-tenants to legally
shoot the seismic survey.

D.

Disputes Between Joint Lessees as to the Development of the Prospect
1.

No Operating Agreement Among Joint Lessees

It is uncommon for joint lessees o f a tract to commence operations without executing a joint
operating agreement. Occasionally, in hot areas with high competition for leases, a tract, with
multiple owners, will be jointly leased by different lessees. To explore this possibility, assume that
there is a tract containing 100 net mineral acres. The mineral estate o f the tract is owned one-half
by X and one-half by Y. Oil Company A takes a lease from X, but cannot get a lease from Y.
Company B is, however, successful in leasing the remaining one-half mineral interest from Y.

10

To rapidly develop a hot prospect, Oil Company A obtains a drilling permit, and drills a
producing well on an 80-acre proration unit. Company A does not seek to enter a joint operating
agreement with Company B and in fact, Company A proceeds as if it has a lease on the entire
mineral estate. The spacing rules do not allow for the drilling o f a well on the remaining 20 acres
o f the tract. Company B, learning of the well, offers to pay its one-half share o f such well and to
execute a joint operating agreement with Company A as the operator. Company A, however, ignores
this request and continues to pay royalty owner X and Company A makes no payment to Company
B or royalty owner Y.
Company B, of course, considers itself a co-tenant in the mineral estate with Company A and
entitled to one-half of the net proceeds from production from the well after Company A recovers the
cost of the well. Meanwhile Company B is concerned that its lease is nearing the end o f its primary
term, and moreover, its lessor Y, has not been paid any royalties and is threatening to sue.
Surprisingly, under Texas law, there is authority that Company A ’s drilling on the tract, and
establishing commercial production, does not perpetuate Company B ’s lease from Y. Hughes v.

Cantwell, 540 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso, 1976 writ r e f d n.r.e.). Further, Company B
cannot obtain a drilling permit on the remaining 20 acres undeveloped on the tract since it is less
than the minimum proration unit allowed by the conservation agency.
The above-described fact situation, although seemingly bizarre, is occurring in various active
trends in East Texas. Although there is authority to the contrary, a better reasoned approach is to
treat Company A as the co-tenant of Company B in the mineral estate and then apply the standard
law o f co-tenancy with regard to one co-tenant’s development o f the mineral estate. See generally,

Willson v. Superior Oil Co., 274 S,W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1955, writ r e f d n.r.e.)
That result, however, is not assured.
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a.

Disputes Among Joint Working Interest Owners as to the
Successor Operator Under a Joint Operating Agreement

As a result of increased oil and gas prices, and consolidation of the oil and gas industry, many
oil and gas leaseholds have been traded in the last several years. Often, when an operator under a
joint operating agreement sells its leasehold interest subject to that agreement, the purchasing
company wishes to take over as the successor operator. Under the common form o f joint operating
agreement, there is a specified procedure for electing a successor operator, such that, if the selling
operator does not have the majority interest, the purchasing company is not assured o f being elected
as the successor operator. In the event of active development, and as to any projects that have been
begun, and are under way, on the date of sale, operator problems may immediately arise - unless the
joint owners promptly elect a successor operator. Occasionally, a minority working interest owner
will attempt to obtain additional consideration from the buyer - prospective successor operator, for
that minority working interest owner’s vote for the buyer as the successor operator. In any event,
a dispute as to the successor operator can cause very severe problems with respect to the orderly
development of the prospect, especially as to projects under way on the date o f the sale.

2.

Real Life Dispute With Regard to Successor Operator as to Projects
Previously Approved by Other Interest Owners

In this dispute there were four companies that owned the working interest in a block o f leases
covering several thousand acres. Each company owns a quarter interest.

Company A is the

designated operator who has obtained approval for the drilling o f a deep gas well, and the
recompletion of several other deep wells. Prior to beginning drilling o f the well, Company A sold
its interest in this prospect to Company B. Company B promptly sent the other parties a request to
be elected operator. One o f the other working interest owners, Company C, however, wanted to be
the operator. The other two working interest owners could not, or would not, decide on whom to
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vote in as successor operator. Meanwhile, Company B had already begun drilling the deep gas well,
and the other recompletion operations, that have been previously approved. Company C filed a
lawsuit seeking to enjoin Company B from proceeding with operations since Company B had not
been duly elected as successor operator to Company A. In its suit, Company C sought an injunction
enjoining Company B from all further operations, including the drilling o f the deep gas well which
was at approximately 9,000 feet total depth on way to the target formation at 15,000 feet.
Interrupting the drilling of the well, and discontinued drilling operation, would have cost millions
o f dollars and possibly resulted in the loss o f the hole.
a.

Actions to Resolve Dispute

The following action may promptly resolve this dispute:
1.

Seek a court appointed receiver to take over operations under the joint operating

agreement until the parties can select a successor operator. Both Arkansas and Texas have specific
statutory provisions providing for the appointment o f a receiver as to jointly owned property if that
property is in jeopardy of harm, or diminution in value, resulting from an impasse between the joint
owners o f that property. A r k . Co de § 16-117-207; and Te x . Ci v . Pr a c . & Re m . Co d e §
64.001(a)(3); Davis v. Johnson, 251 A r k . 1078, 479 S.W.2d 525 (1972) (court approved
appointment o f receiver to grant oil and gas lease to prevent drainage o f tract on which title in
dispute); Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 136 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. 1940); and United

North & South Oil Co. v. Meredith, 272 S.W.124 (Tex. Comm. on App. 1925).
2.

Under most joint operating agreements, the prior operator remains the operator o f

record until such time as it is replaced pursuant to the election provisions o f the joint operating
agreement - even if the operator has sold its interest. See Purvis Oil Corp. v. Hillin, 890 S.W .2d931,
936 (Tex. App.— El Paso 1994, no writ)(holding that the “except the selection o f a successor”
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language in an operating agreement “makes it apparent that action by the non-operators is required,
namely they must select a successor operator before the operator will be deemed to have resigned”).
Therefore, Company A, even though it sold its interest to Company B, would remain on as the
holdover operator, and Company A could then contract with Company B to be the, defacto, operator
for Company A - until the joint interest owners elect a successor operator. In this manner, the
recalcitrant working interest owner, Company C, would be deprived o f its leverage o f the threat o f
discontinuing operations if Company B is not elected operator.
By this two-pronged approach, disruptions o f the previously approved operations should be
obviated. Under the receivership approach, when the court selects a receiver, an operator, the
recalcitrant Company C will not be able to interrupt operations, or use the threat o f interrupting
operations, to further its election as the successor operator. Moreover, Company C, and the other
two fence setting non-operating owners, will be forced to pay their proportionate share o f the
receivership expenses, which receivership will require court supervision o f virtually all activities and
is a very expensive, time consuming, and awkward method to operate oil and gas properties. The
prospect of the expensive, and cumbersome, receivership proceeding will generally have a very
salutary effect in resolving the successor operator impasse. Included at Attachment 1 is a copy o f
a form o f motion for the appointment o f a receiver in such a successor operator dispute.

E.

Surface Use Dispute Between the Mineral and the Surface Estate

Disputes between surface owners and mineral owners abound. Several of the more common
types o f surface/mineral estate disputes are discussed below. This section on surface use disputes
is taken, in large part, from the excellent article by Mr. Rick D. Davis, Jr., Conflicts Between Surface

Owners and Mineral Lessees, Arkansas Bar Association, 42nd Annual Natural Resource Law
Institute, February 2003.
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1.

Exploration, Drilling, and Production Surface User Disputes

In Arkansas, Texas, and virtually every other jurisdiction, the owner of the mineral estate has
the right to use so much of the surface as may be reasonably necessary to develop the mineral estate.

E . g .,Cranston v. Miller , 208 Ark. 156, 185 S.W.2d 920 (1945); Harris v. Curry, 176 S.W.2d 302
(Tex. 1943); and Ball v. Dillard , 602 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1980). Stated differently, the owner of
mineral estate, including his lessee, has the cost-free use o f so much o f the surface estate as is
reasonably necessary to explore for, drill, and produce hydrocarbons from beneath the surface estate
- without any obligation on the part of the mineral owner to compensate the surface owner for such
use. Thus, in the absence o f some express contractual provision in the lease, the surface owner has
no right to recover surface damages from the mineral owner, or their lessee, unless the surface owner
can prove that the mineral owner, or lessee, used more o f the land than was reasonably necessary or
the surface owner can prove specific acts o f negligence. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Williams, 420
S.W.2d 133 (Tex. 1967); see also Vest v. Exxon, 752 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1985). But, if the mineral
owner, or its lessee, uses more of the surface than is reasonably necessary, the mineral owner will
be liable for damages occasioned by that unreasonable use. Ball v. Dillard, supra. Although not
exhaustive, the following is a list of a mineral owner, or lessee’s, use o f the surface that has been
approved by courts:
a.

The right to enter upon the surface and use existing roadways: Ball v. Dillard, supra ;
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Williams, supra; and Property Owners o f Leisure
Land, Inc. v. Woolf & MaGee, 786 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. Civ. A pp.-Tyler, l990, no
writ).

b.

The right to take a reasonable amount of water from the surface development for the
production of minerals: Stradley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 155 S.W.2d. 649 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo, 1941, writ r e f 'd); Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808
(Tex. 1972) (holding lessee had right to take such water as reasonable necessary for
a water flood project). Texas, however, has enacted a statute restricting the lessee’s
ability to use water for secondary recovery purposes. Section 27.0511 (c), (d) o f the
Te xa s Wa t e r Co d e . Under that statute, before a lessee may use water for
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secondary recovery purposes the Railroad Commission must first consider whether
there are some other “solid, liquid, or gaseous substance” economically feasible and
technically available for the lessee for such recovery processes and if there is, the
lessee must use such other substance instead o f fresh water. The right o f the owner
to use water from beneath the surface o f a tract does not extend to the use o f such
water for off premises uses. Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865
(Tex. 1973).
c.

The right to dispose of saltwater: TDC Engineering, Inc. v. Dunlap, 686 S. W.2d 346
(Tex. Civ. A pp-Eastland 1985, writ r e f 'd n.r.e). But this right is subject to the
Railroad Commission of Texas regulation and such injection requires prior Railroad
Commission approval. Statewide Rule 9, 16 Te x . A dm in . Co d e § 3.9.

d.

The right to select drilling sites: Stephenson v. Glass, 276 S.W. 1110 (Tex. Civ.
A pp.-San Antonio 1925, writ r e f 'd , per curiam , 279 S.W. 260 ( Tex. 1926); Grimes
v. Goodman Drilling Co., 216 S.W. 202 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth, 1919, writ
dism ’d); Lecroy v. Barney, 12 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1926) (interpreting Arkansas law);
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Wood, 240 Ark. 948, 403 S.W.2d 54 (1966).

e.

The right to construct production o f storage facilities, including the laying o f
pipelines, building storage tanks, power stations, and other structures, necessary to
produce, save, care for and dispose of, the oil and gas produced from the tract.
However, this right does not include the use o f surface o f the tract for the
development and production from adjoining tracts: Joyner v. R. H. Deering and Sons,
134 S.W .2d 757 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1939); Ottis v. Haus, 569 S.W .2d 508
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ r e f 'd n.r.e.); and Mobil Pipe Line Co. v.
Smith , 860 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1993, dism ’d w.o.j.).

Although the mineral estate is the dominant estate, the mineral estate is restricted from (i)
unreasonable use of the surface estate, and (ii) the negligent use o f the surface estate. Thus, a
mineral owner, or its lessee, must respond in damages for their negligent use o f the surface estate.

E.g. Brown v. Lundell, 344 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1961), General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken , 344 S.W .2d
668 (Tex. 1961); and Scurlock Oil Co. v. Harrell, 443 S.W .2d 334 (Tex. Civ. A pp-A ustin 1969,
writ r e f 'd n.r.e.). The mineral owner and its lessee, will be held to the duty to use ordinary care with
regard to its use o f the surface.
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2.

Accommodation Doctrine to Soften the Burden on the Surface Estate of
the Dominance by the Mineral Estate

Most jurisdictions, including Arkansas and Texas, have adopted what is commonly called
the doctrine of accommodation. That is, the dominant mineral estate must conduct its operations
with “due regard” for the rights of the surface owner. See, e.g. General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken , 344
S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1961); Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 271 S.W .2d 410(Tex. 1954); Martin
v. Dale, 21 S.W.2d 428 (Ark. 1929); and Diamond Shamrock Corporation v. Phillips, 511 S.W.2d
160 (Ark. 1974).
The accommodation doctrine has been adopted by Arkansas, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Texas, and West Virginia. The accommodation doctrine does not limit the decision o f whether or
not the mineral owner may use a portion o f the surface to extract the minerals; rather, the doctrine
merely proscribes the method by which the mineral owner may extract such minerals. Vest v. Exxon,

supra . To prevail upon a claim under the accommodation doctrine, the surface owner must prove
that:
1.

Their surface use was in existence prior to the mineral lessee’s conflicting use (not
merely the mineral lease);

2.

They have no reasonable means to develop their land other than with the preexisting
use; and

3.

The mineral lessee has other options which are:
i.

Usual, customary, and reasonable methods;

ii.

Practice in the industry on other similar lands put to similar uses;

iii.

Would not interfere with the surface owner’s preexisting use; and

iv.

Are available on the premises.

Without proof o f each of these elements, the surface owner cannot prevent the disputed use
of the surface by the mineral owner. Stated differently, if the mineral owner has but one means o f
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surface use to produce the minerals, the mineral owner has the right to pursue that use, irrespective
of the damages to the surface. Conversely, if the mineral owner has other reasonable alternative uses
of the surface, and one o f those uses permits the surface owner to continue to use the surface in the
manner intended by the surface owner, then the mineral owner must use the alternative that allows
the continued use o f the surface estate by the surface owner. See, Hanen, Comment, The Surface

Mineral Producer: A Need for Peaceful Co-Existence, 29 Baylor L. Rev. 907 (1977); Ferguson and
Jones, Comment, A New Approach to the Use o f the Surface Estate by Lessee Under an Oil and Gas

Lease, 13 S. Tex. L.J. 269 (1972).

3.

Statutory Surface Damage Legislation

Several states have now enacted statutes to provide for the payment o f damages for the use
of the surface estate - even if that use is reasonable and non-negligent. North Dakota, N.D. CENT.

Co d e § 38-11.1-01, et seq , (1987); Montana, Montana

Co d e An n . § 82-10-501, et seq,; West

Virginia, West Vir gi n ia Co d e § 22B-2-1, et seq. (1985); Tennessee, Ten ne ss ee Co d e An n . § 601-601, et seq (1989), see, Polston, Redefining the Relationship Between the Surface Owner and the

Mineral Developer, 12 East Minn. L. Fund § 22.02 (1991); and Hultin, Recent Developments in
Statutory and Judicial Accommodation Between Surface and Mineral Owners, 28 Rocky Mtn. Minn.
L. Inst. 1021 (1983); Oklahoma, Okla . St a t . An n . Tit l e 52, § 318.2-318.9 (1991); Illinois, III.

An n . St a t . Ch. 96 1/2, §§ 9 651, e t seq, (1996); Kentucky, Ky .R e v . St a t . An n . § 353.595 (1996).
The North Dakota Act requires twenty (20) days notice of the surface owner. The operator’s
failure to give the requisite notice may permit the surface owner to recover punitive damages.
Further, in that notice, the mineral user must propose payment o f damages resulting from the surface
use, including “loss of agricultural production and income, lost land value, loss o f use and access
to the surface owner’s land, and lost value o f improvements.” Moreover, if the mineral owner’s
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offer o f payment of damages is refused by the surface owner, and the surface owner recovers in a
legal action, an amount larger than the offer, the surface owner may recover its attorneys’ fees, costs
and interest, accruing from the date the use o f the surface began plus the surface owner’s actual
surface damages. A surface owner’s refusal o f the damage offer does not prevent the mineral owner
from proceeding with the development o f the property. Further, in the event the surface owner
refuses the tendered damage amount, and recovers, in a legal action, less than the amount offered,
the surface owner has no liability to the mineral owner for the mineral owner’s attorneys’ fees or
court costs. There are very few cases interpreting the aforesaid statutes; however, one Court has
upheld the constitutionality of its surface damage statute. Murphy v. Amoco Production Co., 729
F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1984) (wherein the Court held that the statute did not constitute a denial o f the
lessee’s right of due process and was not an unconstitutional taking of lessee’ property rights, or the
abrogation o f any of lessee’s existing contract rights).

4.

Proposed Arkansas Surface Damage Statute

A proposed bill, pertaining to the payment o f damages to surface owners for oil and gas
operations on their land, will be introduced at the 85th General Assembly o f the Arkansas
Legislature in 2005 (“Act”). In its present form, the proposed bill would provide for notice to, and
compensation to, the surface owner for use o f the surface estate by the “operator,” for all exploration,
including seismic activities, drilling and completion, including meters, surface equipment, and
pipeline installations, that require entry upon the surface estate conducted after the effective date of
the Act.
The “operator,” must offer to pay the surface owner a sum of money equal to the amount of
the damages sustained by the surface owner for loss o f agricultural production and income, loss of
land value, loss of use of and access to the surface owner’s land, and loss o f value o f improvements
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caused by operator’s operations. The Act specifically provides that damages for the temporary loss
o f the surface shall be measured by the cost o f restoring the land to its former condition, with
compensation for loss of use. But, if the cost o f restoring the land to its former condition is greater
than the diminution of the market value o f the land, damages shall be measured at the diminution
of the fair market value of the land. For any permanent damage to the surface, the measure o f such
damages shall be the difference between the fair market value o f the land immediately before the loss
and the fair market value of the land immediately after loss. Moreover, payments contemplated by
the Act shall only cover the lands directly affected by the operator’s operations. Further, the right
to damages under the Act may not be reserved, or assigned, but must follow ownership o f the surface
estate - except with regard to a tenant o f the owner o f the surface estate. The operator, upon
complying with the notice requirements o f the statute, shall be entitled to enter upon the surface
owner’s land to conduct operations and shall have “the power of eminent domain for such purpose.”
In the event that the surface owner rejects the operator’s offer o f a damage settlement, the
surface owner may seek compensation as follows:
a.

Non-binding arbitration: The surface owner may request a non-binding arbitration

pursuant to the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) by
an arbitrator to be agreed upon by the parties, in the absence o f such an agreement, an impartial
arbitrator shall be selected from the National Panel o f Commercial Arbitrators maintained by the
AAA, in accordance with the AAA procedures.
The arbitration is “baseball” arbitration. That is, the operator will submit its proposed
damage settlement amount, and the surface owner will submit its proposed surface damage amount
to the arbitrator, together with such appraisal reports and other evidences they may deem appropriate
to support their respective settlement amounts. The arbitrator’s jurisdiction shall be solely limited
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to choosing either: (a) the operator’s settlement amount or (b) the surface owner’s settlement
amount. The arbitrator shall not have jurisdiction to find a damage settlement amount other than one
of the two settlement amounts proposed either by the operator or by the surface owner. Very
significantly, the arbitrator shall assess all costs o f arbitration, including reasonable attorneys’ fees,
against the party whose settlement amount is not selected by the arbitrator as the appropriate amount
o f compensation. The arbitration is governed by the substantive laws o f the state o f Arkansas
without regard to its conflicts of law rules, and all limitations o f actions shall be determined under
Arkansas law.
Either party to the arbitration may, within fifteen (15) days following the date the arbitrator
issues its non-binding decision, file with the clerk of the circuit court in the county in which the
operations are conducted, a written demand for a trial to find the proper amount of damages to be
awarded to the surface owner. Significantly, the trial shall be conducted, and judgment entered, in
the same manner as a condemnation proceeding before the court - without a jury. If the party
demanding the trial fails to recover a verdict more favorable than the damages awarded by the
arbitrator, all court costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees shall be paid by the party demanding the
trial. That is, loser pays the cost of the trial and his opponent’s reasonable attorneys’ fees. It is
unclear how any costs and attorneys’ fees at arbitration will be awarded at trial.
Any payments made to the operator and accepted by the surface owner under the statute does
not relieve the operator from liability for damages to the surface that may result from the operator’s
negligent use o f such surface or for the operator using more o f the surface than was reasonably
necessary for the exploration, drilling, development and production o f brine, oil, gas, and other
petroleum hydrocarbons from such surface or lands pooled or unitized therewith.
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The proposed Arkansas Act is similar, in many respects to the acts of the other jurisdictions;
however, it is different in that it requires a non-binding “baseball” arbitration, and any trial under the
statute requires that the losing party pay all court costs and its opponent’s attorneys’ fees. The Act
would, it seems, by the arbitration and loser pays provisions, promote fair damage settlement offers
by the operator and reasonable damage demands by the surface owner. Operators, generally will be
better financially able to take the risk o f arbitration and trial, thus, small surface owners may not
have the financial ability to risk paying the operator’s court cost and attorneys’ fees - even when the
operator makes an unreasonably low offer o f surface damages.

5.

Surface Disputes Upon Abandonment

Under Arkansas law, an oil and gas lease has the implied duty to restore the surface o f the
leased premises to its pre-development condition upon cessation of production. E.g., Chevron

U.S.A., Inc. v. Murphy Exploration and Production Co., 2004 W.L. 396263 (Ark. 2004); and Bonds
v. Sanchez-0’Brien Oil & Gas Co., 289 Ark. 582, 715 S.W.2d 444 (1986).
Conversely, under Texas law, the lessee has no implied duty to restore the surface upon
cessation of production. Warren Petroleum v. Monzingo, 304 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1957); and Exxon

Corp. v. Pluff, 94 S.W.3d 22 (Tex. Civ. A pp-T yler 2002, pet. denied). Thus, under Texas law, there
is no implied duty to repair the damage done to the surface caused by the rightful and necessary use
by the lessee. Monzingo at 304 S.W.2d at 363. Moreover, under Texas law, if the current surface
owner acquired the property after the lessee’s alleged wrongful conduct with regard to the surface,
and the current surface owner’s deed did not assign any previous causes of action with regard to the
surface to the current owner, that owner has no standing to sue the lessee for the previous wrongful
conduct. Texas courts have held that the right to sue for injury to property is a personal right that
belongs to the person who owns the property at the time o f the injury. Exxon Corp. v. Plujff 94
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S.W.3d at 27. A mere subsequent purchaser, therefore, cannot recover for an injury committed
before his purchase unless that course o f action was specifically conveyed to the subsequent
purchaser. Id.
Further, under Texas law, the standard provision in most oil and gas leases allowing the
lessee to remove all surface equipment, and draw all casing, within a specified period o f time, or a
reasonable time, does not create an express obligation to remove such equipment or restore the
surface; nor does such a clause create any implied duty to remove the equipment or restore the
surface. Exxon Corp. v. P luff, supra .

6.

The Effect of Indemnity Agreements Among Successive Lessees as to the
Obligation to Restore Surface

The Arkansas Supreme Court has recently considered the effect o f indemnity agreements
between successive owners of an oil and gas leasehold estate to remediate and respond in damages
for harm to the surface estate. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Murphy Exploration & Production Co., 2004
WL 396263 (Ark.)
In Murphy, Gulf Oil Corporation operated an oil and gas lease on a forty acre tract o f land
located in Union County, Arkansas (“Tract”). On August 28, 1987, Chevron assigned its interest
in the Tract to Murphy Oil pursuant to a purchase and sale agreement and assignment o f bill o f sale.
Murphy then operated the oil and gas lease until June 19, 1996, when it sold its leasehold interest
in the forty acre tract to Merritt Energy Partners III, L.P. and Merritt Partners, L.P. (“Merritt”). The
sale contract between Gulf-M urphy Oil, and the sales contract between M urphy Oil-M erritt
contained indemnification clauses.
The owners of the Tract filed suit against Chevron and Merritt for the pollution and
contamination of the Tract and the surrounding environment and alleged that Chevron and Merritt
had improperly handled, transported, stored and disposed o f hazardous, toxic, and harmful
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substances - namely waste from oil and gas exploration and production. Chevron responded and
asserted its right of indemnity against Murphy, and Murphy, in turn, notified M erritt that Murphy
was demanding indemnification from Merritt.
On November 29, 2001, Murphy filed a complaint in Union County circuit court seeking
declaratory judgment against both Chevron and Merritt declaring that Murphy had no obligation to
indemnify Chevron under the Chevron-Murphy purchase sale agreement, because Murphy did not
expressly state, in clear and unequivocal terms, that Murphy would indemnify Chevron for a liability
that Murphy may have caused. In the alternative, Murphy alleged that, even if it had an obligation
to indemnify Chevron, Murphy had the right to indemnity from Merritt. Murphy, Chevron, and
Merritt each filed cross-motions for summary judgment as to the parties' respective claims for
indemnity. The trial court granted Murphy's and M erritt’s motions for summary judgment against
Chevron, denied Chevron’s motion for summary judgment against Murphy and Merritt, denied
M urphy’s motion against Merritt, and granted Merritt’s motion against Murphy.

From this

judgment, Chevron appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that, under
the purchase and sale agreement between Chevron-Murphy, that Murphy was obligated to indemnify
and hold Chevron harmless from all the claims asserted by the surface owners for damages to the
surface o f the Tract, including those claims that accrued during the period o f tim e that Chevron
operated the lease.
Further, the Court held that under the M urphy-M erritt contract that Merritt was obligated to
indemnify Murphy for all liability arising from Murphy’s acts and omissions, and the acts and
omissions o f Murphy’s predecessors in title, including Chevron. Thus, in reversing the Court of
Appeals, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that under the respective indemnity clauses that Murphy
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was obligated to indemnify Chevron, and that Merritt was likewise obligated to indemnify Murphy
and Chevron under the terms of the indemnification agreement between Murphy and Merritt.

The Chevron-Murphy Indemnification Clause
The indemnification clauses in the Chevron-Murphy sales contract provided as follows:
Buyer [Murphy] agrees to protect, indemnify and hold seller [Chevron] harmless
against any and all claims, demands and causes o f action asserted or filed after the
closing o f this purchase and sale in any way arising from operation o f the assets and
the contracts and agreements appertaining thereto based upon any theory of
negligence, willful misconduct, liability without fault or other.
The Murphy-Chevron assignment and bill of sale also provided that:
Assignee [Murphy] agrees to protect, indemnify and hold assignor [Chevron]
harmless from and against any and all liability, loss, damage, injury and claims,
demands and causes of action therefore asserted or filed after the effective date
hereof in any way arising from operations or activities related to the Assigned
Premises, Wells and Personal Property and the contracts and agreements appertaining
thereto based upon any theory o f negligence, willful misconduct, strict liability,
liability without fault or other grounds.

Murphy-Merritt Indemnification Clause
The indemnification clause in the Murphy-Merritt agreement provided that:
Purchaser [Merritt], its successors and assigns, hereby agrees to indemnify and
defend seller [Murphy], its successors and assigns, its officers, directors, agents or
employees, and any and all of seller’s subsidiary, affiliate, or parent company, and
their officers, directors, agents, or employees and any o f seller’s predecessors in title
from and against all claims, demands, damages, obligations, costs and other liabilities
(including attorney’s fees), and causes of action, including any civil fines, penalties,
or costs of clean-up (“environmental claims”), brought by any and all persons,
including (without limitation) purchaser’s and seller’s employees, agents, or
representatives and also including (without limitation) any private citizens, persons,
organizations, any agency, branch or representative o f federal, state or local
government, on account of damage destruction or loss o f property, contamination of
natural resources (including soil, surface, water or ground water) resulting from or
arising out of any liability caused by or connected with the joint, concurrent, or sole
negligence o f seller, any and all o f seller’s subsidiary, affiliate or parent companies,
or any of seller’s predecessors in title (whether active or passive) or the presence,
disposal or release of any material o f any kind in or under the properties at the time
it is conveyed to purchaser or thereafter caused by acts o f purchaser, its agents,
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employees, representatives, successors or assigns with regard to its use o f the
described property subsequent to the conveyance o f described properties.
Both Murphy as to Chevron’s claim for indemnity, and Merritt as to Murphy’s claim for
indemnity, contended that the respective indemnity clauses were not sufficiently clear and
unequivocable to require Murphy to indemnify Chevron and Merritt to indemnify Murphy. The
Supreme Court, however, held that the indemnification clauses in issue were sufficiently clear since
they involved an oil and gas lease contract, which required a somewhat different review from those
of other contracts, such as, construction contracts.
Citing Bonds v. Sanchez-0 ’Brien Oil & Gas Co., supra , the Court reaffirmed the oil and gas
lessee’s duty to restore the surface of the land to the condition prior to commencement o f operations.
The Court drew a distinction between the standard o f review o f indemnity clauses in construction
contracts from those in oil and gas contracts. In that regard, the Court reasoned that:
This implied duty to restore the service in oil and gas contract reflects a different
focus or concern that is found in this court’s other indemnification cases. Generally
speaking, the issues in construction contractor-subcontractor cases have centered
around whether a subcontractor can be held liable for acts o f negligence on the part
of the general contractor, when those acts o f negligence lead to an instance o f
personal injury. [Citation omitted]. In an oil and gas lease case such as the one now
before us, however, the concern is with ongoing environmental issues that frequently
persist over a span of year and that may or may not be known at the time an oil and
gas lease is transferred from one exploration company to another.
Although there were no Arkansas cases on point, the Supreme Court found persuasive the holding
of the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., 14
F.3d. 321 (7th Cir. 1994). Citing Kerr-McGee , the Court reasoned that, in the present case as in

Kerr-McGee, Murphy agreed to purchase the lease from Chevron “as is”; the contract also stated that
Murphy explicitly assumed the “risk o f description, title, and the condition o f the assets and shall
satisfy itself with regard thereto.” Thus, Murphy was, or should have been, on notice o f any existing,
or potential, environmental problems with the property. Further, the indemnity clause provided that
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Murphy would indemnify and hold Chevron harmless against any and all claims arising from the
operation o f the assets, based upon any theory o f negligence, willful misconduct, liability, without
fault, or otherwise. Although the Kerr-McGee indemnity clause specifically mentioned any “action,
claim or order concerning pollution or nuisance,” the language in the Chevron-Murphy agreement
is even broader, providing that Murphy would indemnify Chevron “against any and all claims,
demands and causes of action. . . in any way arising from operation o f the assets . . . based upon any
theory o f negligence, willful misconduct, liability without fault, or otherwise.” Finally, since an oil
and gas lessee has an implied duty to restore the surface o f the land to its pre-development condition
upon cessation of production, Murphy should be held to have known that it was taking on the duty
to restore any existing surface damage to the former Chevron property including the Tract. Id.
Based upon that reasoning, the Supreme Court held that the Chevron-M urphy indemnity
agreement’s language was sufficiently broad to obligate Murphy to indemnify Chevron against all
environmental claims as to the Tract and that the trial court erred in finding that the indemnification
clause did not bind Murphy to indemnify Chevron against the claims asserted by the surface owners
in their federal court lawsuit. Further, based upon its prior legal analysis, the Court held that Merritt,
likewise, had agreed to indemnify Murphy and Chevron against the claims asserted by the surface
owners.

HI.

DISPUTES AS TO EXPRESS COVENANTS AND IMPLIED COVENANTS IN OIL
AND GAS LEASES
It is beyond the scope of this article to address the plethora o f disputes that arise from the

express covenants and implied convents in oil and gas leases. While there have been refinements
in Arkansas and Texas Law in these covenant cases, there have been no recent major changes or
departures from previous well established authority. Rather, the most interesting developments in
covenant litigation in Texas has been with regard to the admissibility o f the expert testimony in such
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cases. Almost all covenant cases, particularly implied covenant cases, require expert testimony to
establish the breach of such implied covenants and the damages resulting from such breaches. The
chances o f a lessor prevailing on a implied covenant claim without expert testimony are “slim and
none” and “slim” just left town. The next section of the article will focus on the admissibility of
expert testimony generally and the admissibility o f oil and gas expert testimony in particular.

IV.

THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN OIL AND GAS LITIGATION
Most oil and gas litigation, particularly implied covenant litigation, requires expert testimony

on the issues of liability and damages. It is, therefore, very important to understand the standards
for the admissibility of such expert testimony. In virtually every jurisdiction, the standard for the
admissibility o f expert testimony has been, as a practical matter, raised substantially. The trial judge
has now been assigned the role of “gatekeeper” as to the admissibility o f expert opinion testimony.
That is, the trial judge, upon proper objection, must, outside the presence o f the jury, screen all
expert testimony for relevance and reliability. If the proffered evidence is not relevant and reliable,
the trial court must exclude the evidence. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993); General Electric Co. v, Joiner , 522 U.S. 136 (1997); and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.

Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); see also, Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Foote , 14 S.W.3d 512
(Ark. 2000); and Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Gill, 352 Ark. 240, 100 S.W.3d 715 (2003) (applying
Rule 702’s requirements equally to all types o f expert testimony and not simply to scientific expert
testimony).
Gone are the days when an expert, with the proper credentials, i.e., the proper education,
training or experience, could opine on virtually any issue within the purview o f his area o f expertise.
The old practice, although based on a supposedly higher standard was, in effect, more liberal and
resulted in a proliferation of what is popularly called “junk science.” Daubert, and its progeny, have,
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in practice, greatly restricted the admissibility o f expert testimony at trial and have spawned an
expanded pretrial hearing practice as to the admissibility o f expert testimony. In essence, the new
test for the admissibility o f expert testimony is that the offered expert testimony be scientific, i.e.,
that the alleged cause be rationally connected to the alleged result. The revolution in the admissibility
of exert testimony is, at its base, the requirement o f a more rigorous scientific proof o f causation.
That is, if a plaintiff contends that X is a cause o f Y, then the plaintiff must prove that “but for X”
the event Y would not have occurred. Until recently, the proof o f what is called “but for” causation
was simple: hire a qualified expert, have the expert testify that, based upon his education and/or
experience, X was a cause of Y, ipse dixit (translated: it is so, because I say it is so). Under Daubert,
such purported expert testimony is not admissible, because it is not reliable; it is not based in the
“scientific method.” But, what is the scientific method?

A.

The Scientific Method and Lawyer Sir Francis Bacon

It is altogether fitting that the “Scientific Method” was pioneered by a the philosopher,
lawyer, legal scholar, and statesman, Sir Francis Bacon (1561 - 1626). Bacon pioneered in the
method of scientific empiricism, or eliminative empiricism. Novum Organum (1620). His original
concepts were not based upon mathematics, or physics, but upon the theory o f evidence that he had
developed from his study o f the English common law. Bacon was Lord Chancellor for King James
I, and he analyzed the unwritten common law to establish the underlying unwritten principles o f the
common law.
In Bacon’s time, the teachings and methods o f Aristotle were transcendent although Aristotle
had been dead for two thousand years. Basically, the Aristotelean method held that scientific truth,
indeed all truth, could be achieved by way of authoritative argument, i. e., if sufficiently clever men
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discussed a subject long enough, the truth would eventually be discovered. Bacon, o f course,
disagreed with the Aristotelean method and found it woefully lacking.
Bacon was certain that his method could be, and should be, applied to all reasoning. It has
been said o f Bacon that:
Bacon did no science that today would have won him a Nobel prize. He founded no
schools of philosophy. He was not, like Aristotle, “the master o f them that know.”
But he was the friend of those who think, and for that reason, his writings should not
be laid aside.
Friedberg, Francis Bacon and the True Ends o f Skepticism, The Skeptical Inquirer Magazine, Vol.
24, No. 6 (November/December 2000).
One science primer defines the “Scientific Method” as follows:
The scientific method is the process by which scientists, collectively and over time,
endeavor to construct an accurate (that is, reliable, consistent and non-arbitrary)
representation of the world.
Recognizing that personal and cultural beliefs influence both our perceptions and our
interpretations o f natural phenomena, we aim through the use o f standard procedures
and criteria to minimize those influences when developing a theory. As a famous
scientist once said, “Smart people (like smart lawyers) can come up with very
good explanations for mistaken points of view.” In summary, the scientific
method attempts to minimize the influence of bias or prejudice in the
experimenter when testing an hypothesis or a theory.
The Scientific Method has four steps:
1.

Observation and description o f a phenomenon or group o f phenomenon.

2.

Formation o f an hypothesis to explain the phenomena. In physics, the
hypothesis often takes the form o f a causal mechanism or a mathematical
relation,

3.

Use o f the hypothesis to predict the existence o f other phenomena, or to
predict quantitatively the results o f new observations.

4.

Performance of experimental tests o f the predictions by several independent
experimenters and properly performed experiments.
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If the experiment bears out the hypothesis it may come to be regarded as a theory or
law o f nature. If the experiments do not bear out the hypothesis, it must be rejected
or modified. What is key in the description of the scientific method just given is
the predictive power of the hypothesis or theory, as tested by experiment. It is
often said in science that theories can never be proved, only disproved. There
is always the possibility that a new observation o r a new experiment will conflict
with a long-standing theory. (Emphasis added).
University of Rochester, N.Y., Physics Education Lab , Appendix E.
Two common mistakes in applying the Scientific Method are:
1.

To mistake the hypothesis for an explanation of the phenomenon without testing, or
verifying, the hypothesis. Often, “common sense” and “logic” tempt one into
thinking that no testing is needed.

2.

To ignore, or rule out, data which do not support the hypothesis. The scientist may
have a strong belief that the hypothesis is true (or false) or is under internal or
external pressure to get a specific result. In such circumstances, the temptation is to
find “something wrong or to discount” the data, or facts, that do not fit or support the
hypothesis. Conversely, data which agrees with the scientist’s position may not be
checked as carefully.

The Scientific Method works best where one can isolate the phenomenon o f interest, by
eliminating or accounting for extraneous factors, and where one can test repeatedly the system under
study after limited, controlled, changes to it. This very general discussion o f the Scientific Method
is of little practical help in making, or responding to, Robinson/Daubert challenges.

It does,

however, provide some context for a better understanding o f the Court’s reasoning in Daubert and

Robinson .
It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully analyze and discuss the nuances o f Daubert, Rule
702 of the A r k a n s a s R u l e s of E v id e n c e , and the Arkansas cases, as to the admissibility o f expert
testimony. However, the following general discussion o f the recent authorities, observations, and
forms, may be helpful to the practitioner in selecting and preparing an expert and in objecting to the
testimony o f an opponent’s expert witness.
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B.

Rule 702 of the Arkansas

R u l e s o f Ev id e n c e - Testimony of Experts

The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Rule 702 o f the A r k a n s a s R u l e s OF
E v id e n c e , which provides that:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. (Emphasis added).
1.

Qualification of the Expert

To offer expert opinion testimony, the expert must, o f course, be qualified in his particular
field. An expert is qualified under Rule 702 if (i) the expert has the necessary knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education and (ii) the expertise o f the expert will assist the trier o f fact to
understand and to determine the disputed fact issue. The expert must possess skills, knowledge or
experience not possessed by the average lay person and must possess skills, knowledge, or
experience in respect of the very matter on which the expert proposes to testify. As a practical
matter, in m ost oil and gas cases, the first prong o f the qualification test is easily met, i.e., the fact
disputes almost always involve technical geologic or engineering issues, the analysis well beyond
the skills and experience of the average person. The second prong can be met if the expert was
properly selected, i. e., the expert has the education, training and experience as to the very matter on
which the expert will testify. By way o f example, a petroleum engineering expert may not be
qualified to testify, if his area of expertise is reservoir engineering, and he is attempting to offer
opinion evidence as to deep, high pressure drilling-even though he holds an M.S. or Ph.D. in
Petroleum Engineering.

The practitioner should thoroughly examine a prospective expert’s

background with the fact issues in dispute including requesting that the expert provide the dates,
times, and places, of specific jobs, or assignments involving the same, or similar, fact issues as the
one in litigation. It is better to spend the time, in the initial stages o f the dispute, finding the truly
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qualified expert than spending the time immediately prior to trial trying to polish the expertise of the
expert. Generally, in oil and gas disputes, there are many well educated and experienced experts in
virtually every phase of the business. Once a properly qualified expert is selected, the problem then
becomes: will the expert’s opinion be admissible in view o f the theory and methodology upon which
the expert bases his opinion?

2.

Daubert- The Reliability of the Expert’s Methodology and the Relevance
of His Opinion

Even a qualified expert will not be allowed to testify unless the science and methodology of
his analysis is reliable and is relevant to the very fact in issue.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra; General Electric Co. v. Joiner, supra; and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichael, supra; see also, Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Foote , supra; and Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Gill, supra. The A r

k a n sa s

R u l e s of E v id e n c e , and those o f most jurisdictions, are based

upon the F e d e r a l R u l e s of E v id e n c e ; hence, federal cases-particularly U. S. Supreme Court cases,
are very persuasive in interpreting the Arkansas rules. Virtually every jurisdiction in the United
States, including Arkansas, has adopted the Daubert standard for the admission of expert scientific
evidence. Most jurisdictions, including Arkansas, have also adopted Kumho Tire and require that
the same reliability and relevancy principles o f Daubert apply to all experts-not just scientific
experts. Thus, the recent decisions o f Daubert and Kumho Tire must be studied and addressed to
effectively deal with expert testimony at trial.
In Daubert, the plaintiffs, two minor children and their parents, brought suit for damages
against Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc (“Dow”). The plaintiffs alleged that the children had suffered
serious birth defects as a result o f the mothers’ prenatal ingestion o f the drug Bendectin marketed
by Dow. The trial court entered summary judgment for Dow ruling that the plaintiffs’ expert
testimony was not admissible. The plaintiffs’ expert had testified that Bendectin had caused the birth

33

defects. The trial court held that the evidence was inadmissible, because it did not meet the
applicable “general acceptance” standard for the admission on expert testimony. The plaintiffs
appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, citing Frye v. United States , 293 F. 1013
(1923), holding that expert opinion, based upon scientific technique is inadmissible unless the
technique is “generally accepted” as reliable in the relevant scientific community. In reversing the
courts below, and remanding to the trial court, the Supreme Court held that Rule 702, not Frye,
controlled the admissibility of expert scientific testimony. The Court rejected the rigid “generally
accepted” standard in favor of the more liberal and relaxed approach embodied in the Rules, in
general, and Rule 702 in particular. The Court further held that the Rules, and especially Rule 702,
place limits on the admissibility of proffered expert scientific testimony by assigning to the trial
judge the duty of ensuring that the expert’s testimony rests both on a reliable foundation and is
relevant to the issue which is the object o f the testimony. By using the term “scientific . . ,
knowledge,” Rule 702 requires that the expert’s opinion be grounded in science’s methods and
procedures. The expert’s method, and his application of that method, must be reliable. Further, the
R ule’s requirement that the testimony “assist the trier o f fact to understand the evidence or to
determine the fact in issue” requires that the expert testimony be relevant to the issue in dispute. The
Court further held that when an expert’s opinion was proffered, the trial judge, pursuant to Rule
104(a), must conduct a preliminary assessment, outside the presence o f the jury, to determine
whether the testimony’s underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically reliable and whether
that methodology is properly applied to the facts at issue. The Court held that many factors may bear
on the trial court’s determination; the test is flexible and no given set of factors will be pertinent to
all proffered expert testimony. The Court enumerated the following factors appropriate to the
testimony at bar:
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a.

Whether the theory, or technique, in question can be, and has been tested;

b.

Whether the theory, or technique, has been subjected to peer review and/or
publication;

c.

Its known or potential error rate; and

d.

Whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific
community.

The trial judge is to focus his inquiry only on the reliability and relevance o f the scientific theory or
methodology-not on the conclusions that the theory or methodology generate.

3.

Kumho Tire: Daubert Applies to AH Experts Not Just Scientific Experts

In Kumho Tire, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Daubert applied to all experts—both
scientific experts and experts relying only upon skill or experience. In Kumho Tire, the plaintiffs
brought a damage suit as a result of a tire blowout that caused the vehicle to turn over killing one
passenger and injuring the driver and other passengers. The plaintiffs case was based upon the
expert opinion of an accident reconstruction engineer who opined that a defect in the tire’s
manufacture, or design, caused the blowout. That opinion was based upon a visual and tactile
inspection o f the tire and upon the theory that, in the absence of a least two o f four specific physical
symptoms indicating tire abuse, the tire failure in issue was necessarily caused by a defect. The
defendant moved to exclude the testimony o f the engineer. The trial court held that the Daubert
factors applied and excluded the expert testimony. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court and
held that Daubert was limited to scientific evidence and did not apply to the engineer’s testimony,
which the Court characterized as based on skill or experience. The Supreme Court reversed the
Court o f Appeals and held that the Daubert factors apply to the testimony o f engineers and other
experts who are not scientists. The trial court’s “gatekeeping” duty applies not only to scientific
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testimony but to all expert testimony. Rule 702 does not distinguish between “scientific” knowledge
and “technical” or “other specialized” knowledge. In determining the admissibility o f an engineering
expert’s testimony, the trial court may consider one or more of the specific Daubert factors. The

Daubert factors do not constitute a definitive checklist or litmus test. Rather, the trial court’s
gatekeeping inquiry must be tied to the particular facts of the case at hand. The engineer in Kumho

Tire was qualified, and the question was not his methodology, in general, but whether that
methodology could reliably determine the cause o f the failure o f the particular tire at issue. Of
course, the engineer claimed that his method was accurate, but the Court stated that:
[A]s we pointed out in Joiner, nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of
Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to
existing data only by the ipse dixit o f the expert.
In Joiner , the Court held that, even as to experienced based expert opinion:
A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the
data and the opinion proffered.
The court analysis in Joiner and Kumho has been referred to as the “analytical gap test” for
experienced based non-scientific experts.
In most oil and gas cases, the geologic or engineering theory underlying the expert’s opinion
is likely well developed and accepted in the industry. The problem is generally whether the expert
has properly applied the theory or methodology.

If the expert is using a proven theory, or

methodology, in a new or unusual way, it will be subject to a challenge under the reasoning of

Daubert, Kumho Tire, and Joiner.
4.

Arkansas Has Adopted the Holding in Daubert as to the Admissibility of
Expert Testimony Under Rule 702 of the Ar k a n s a s R u l e s o f E v id e n c e

In April 2000, the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the holding in Daubert in determining
the admissibility o f expert testimony under Rule 702 o f the ARKANSAS Rul e s o f Ev id e n c e . Farm
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Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Foote, supra. In Foote, the Footes' home was destroyed by a fire;
they filed a claim under their homeowners insurance policy with Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.
(“Farmer Bureau”). After an investigation, Farm Bureau determined that the fire was the result of
arson and denied coverage; the Footes filed suit on the insurance policy for damages. At trial, Farm
Bureau offered the expert testimony of Trooper Estes, an investigator of the Arkansas State Police,
that his specially trained dog, Benjamin, had detected the presence o f accelerants in the burned out
home. Farm Bureau proffered Estes' testimony that the dog was better able to detect the presence
o f accelerants than the laboratory equipment used by the investigating chemist. Farm Bureau,
therefore, offered the testimony to explain why the dog had made five “hits” while the chemist had
only detected measurable amounts of accelerants in two samples. The trial court denied the
admission of the proffered expert testimony based upon the holding in Daubert. In affirming the
trial court, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that:

The trial court denied admission of the proffered testimony based on the
holding in Daubert, 508 U.S. 579. This court has not previously adopted the
holding in Daubert. We do now. (Emphasis added).
The Court also cited Prater v. State , 820 S.W .2d 429 (Ark. 1991) wherein the Court had previously
adopted what it characterized as a strikingly similar approach to Daubert in determining the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence.
As noted above, the opponents o f Arkansas Supreme Court, in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.

Gill, applied Daubert and Foote to all experts equally to all types of expert testimony - not merely
scientific testimony. In Johnson v. State, 2004 WL 2476455 (Nov. 2004), the Arkansas Supreme
Court has held that the Dauber/Kumho tests for admissibility did not apply to the experience based
expert testimony of a “criminal gang” expert. In holding the court stated that:
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Accordingly, we agree with Kumho Tire that whether a trial court relies on the
specific factors outlined in Daubert is within the circuit court’s discretion and
depends on the facts of the case. In the case before us, the circuit court did not
employ the Daubert criteria, but Officer Hurd testified that he had been working in
the gang intelligence unit of the Little Rock Police Department since 1995 and had
personally interviewed over 300 gang members. He added that he had personally
documented gang tattooing and graffiti and was personally familiar with the locations
of the gangs and their rivalries. He had also been qualified as a gang expert in other
courts of law. Because Officer Hurd’s testimony was premised upon his personal
experiences in dealing with gangs over a number o f years, it differs from expert
testimony which rests purely on a scientific foundation. We conclude that the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct a Daubert analysis to
determine the reliability o f Officer Hurd’s testimony. Moreover, the circuit court did
not abuse its discretion by ruling that the testimony was reliable based on Officer
Hurd’s knowledge and experiences.
It thus appears that Arkansas may be a great deal more liberal in allowing the admission of
knowledge and experienced based experts than the Courts are in Texas. As a result, experienced
based oil and gas experts such as geophysicists, geologists, and certain petroleum engineering
disciplines, should have less difficulties as to the admissibility o f their expert testimony.
5.

Joiner - Kumho - T he Analytical Gap Test

In Joiner and Kumho , the Court applied what has become known as an “analytical gap test”
to the experience based expert testimony as opposed to applying the Daubert factors which are
applicable to scientific evidence. It is generally much easier for an expert to pass muster under the
“analytical gap test” than the Daubert factors. In most oil and gas cases, particularly the lessorlessee implied covenant cases, most o f the expert testimony is based upon well established
principles, and the technical skill and experience o f the expert. Normally, such expert testimony
does not involve new, or cutting edge, science. In such cases, the proponent o f the testimony will
likely gain an advantage by characterizing the expert as a “non-scientific” expert and should
concentrate on showing that the expert’s opinion is primarily based upon his experience and training.
Texas has adopted the “analytical gap test” as to the admissibility o f experienced based expert
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testimony. E.g., Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. 1998). To better
understand the application of the analytical gap test, it is helpful to study Gammill and its progeny.
In an excellent article, Keller, Bridging the Analytical Gap: The Gammill Alternative to

Overcoming Robinson & Havner Challenges to Expert Testimony, 33 St. Mary’s L. J. 277 (2002),
the author discusses the advantages o f the proponent o f expert testimony convincing the Court to
apply the Gammill - “analytical gap test” versus the factors set out in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
v. Robinson , 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995) (adopting Daubert). The author also discusses the Texas
cases in which Courts have applied the analytical gap test to engineering and other technical
testimony. Id. at 307, 308, 309. Several recent cases are illustrative. E.g., Olin Corp. v. Smith, 990
S.W .2d 789(Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied); Nissan Motor Co. v. Armstrong, 3 2 S .W .3d 701
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 145 S.W.131 (Tex. 2004); Ford

Motor Co. v, Aguiniga, 9 S.W.3d 252 (Tex. A p p -S an Antonio 1999, pet. denied); and American
Tourmaline Fields v. International Paper Co., 1999 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 5790 (N.D. Tex.-D allas
1999).
In Olin Corp., the plaintiffs alleged that the “hangfire” o f an Olin manufactured .22 caliber
pistol cartridge caused severe injury to their minor son. Olin challenged the admissibility o f the
plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony on causation. Specifically, Olin argued, and offered opinion evidence,
that it was “chemically” impossible for rimfire ammunition using lead styphnate primer to hangfire,
under any condition, for more than a few milliseconds. Olin, therefore, objected to the plaintiffs’
experts, because they did not present any reliable evidence to demonstrate that it was chemically
possible for m odem rimfire ammunition, using lead styphnate primer, to hangfire for the period o f
time necessary to have caused the injury in dispute.
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The plaintiffs’ experts did not conduct any testing o f Olin’s cartridges. Each o f the plaintiffs’
three experts, however, were eminently qualified by vast experience with firearms and ammunition,

i.e., one was a gunsmith who had been the gunsmith for the U.S. Olympic shooting team, U.S.
Marine Corps rifle and pistol teams, and had designed and built the first 138 o f the model M40AM
sniper rifles presently used by all U.S. Marine Corps snipers. The plaintiffs’ other experts were (i)
a retired Texas Department of Public Safety (“D.P.S.”) officer, who had trained approximately 7000
D.P.S. officer cadets in firearms and (ii) the chief engineer o f the world’s largest and oldest
independent testing laboratory for guns and ammunition. The plaintiffs’ three experts, in effect,
testified that, O lin’s chemistry notwithstanding, they had personally seen, or experienced, hangfire
events involving modern ammunition using lead styphnate primers. Olin objected on the grounds
that such testimony was merely “anecdotal” and was not based on any scientific tests. The trial court
overruled O lin’s challenge and entered judgment for the plaintiffs based upon the challenged
experts’ testimony.
In affirming the trial court’s denial of Olin’s motion to strike the plaintiffs’ expert testimony,
the Court o f Appeals, citing Gammill, held that:
The supreme court has made clear that the factors set forth in Robinson for assessing
the reliability of expert testimony are nonexclusive and will differ with each
particular case and the nature o f the evidence offered. The court has reasoned that
those factors are germane in evaluating whether the expert is a professional witness
or a person whose opinion in the courtroom will withstand the same scrutiny that it
would in the particular industry and among the expert’s professional peers.
***
The court in Gammill noted that experts may testify “about specific defects and design
changes based on years of experience with the product itself and others like it, a knowledge o f the
industry, and publications on the subject” when the bases for it are shown to be reliable. Id. The
testimony o f the Smiths’ [plaintiffs’] experts was based on experience, training, and skill rather than
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on the application o f scientific principles. The trial court concluded that the testimony o f the Smiths’
experts was reliable and relevant and would assist the trier o f fact.
* * *

The Smiths’ experts offered testimony of their technical and specialized knowledge,
based on skill, training, and experience, and explained Joshua’s [the injured minor’s]
shooting in a manner that corroborated the eyewitness testimony.
*

*

*

Their opinions were based not only on years of experience in manufacturing firearms, testing
firearms, and training others to use firearms, but on experience and actually observing ammunitionrelated hangfires lasting in the range o f one-half second to two seconds.
Only Olin Corporation’s experts testified to the contrary. They claimed that a hangfire of
longer than 250 milliseconds is chemically impossible. In the opinion o f Olin’s experts, Joshua shot
himself. This theory was refuted by the testimony of both the eyewitnesses to the shooting and the
Smiths’ experts.
The trial court was not bound to accept the conclusions offered by either Olin’s experts or
the Smiths’ experts, notwithstanding Olin’s contention that the opinions o f its experts were based
on unalterable scientific principles. Opinion testimony does not establish any material fact as a
matter o f law and is never binding on the trier of fact.
* * *

Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in
determining that the testimony o f the Smiths’ experts was reliable and admitting it
in evidence. Because the testimony was properly admitted, it could be considered
probative evidence on which to base a judgment favoring the Smiths.

Olin Corp. v. Smith, 990 S.W.2d at 795, 797-98.
In Olin, the plaintiffs overcame purported conclusive “chemical,” or “scientifically,” based
evidence and proved that the primer could, and did, hangfire long enough to cause the injury. The
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plaintiffs were able to avoid the application o f the Robinson [Daubert] factors by the combination
o f the extensive experience and training of their experts and the testimony o f several eyewitnesses
as to the length of time of the hangfire.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Aguiniga , supra; and Nissan Motor Co. v. Armstrong , supra , both
automobile products liability design defect cases, the plaintiffs' experts survived challenges based
upon the courts application of the Gammill “analytical gap test." In affirming the trial courts ruling
on the admissibility o f the plaintiffs’ expert testimony, the Court o f Appeals in Nissan stated that:
Here, the evidence shows that Mizen [plaintiffs’ expert] had a masters degree in
mechanical engineering, worked for many years as a mechanical engineer, and had
experience in vehicle dynamics, design and performance. The alleged defect about
which he rendered an opinion relates to a relatively simple automotive component,
the throttle control cable, which did not require an explanation from a “rocket
scientist" for the jury to understand. Indeed, almost any qualified mechanical expert
could show the jury how the cable worked and how a loose dust boot might stick on
the throttle cable and prevent the accelerator mechanism from closing. See Gammill,
972 S.W.2d at 727; see also The Kroger Co. v. Betancourt, 996 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.
A pp-H ouston [14th Dist.] 1999, rev. denied). As a result, we find the trial court did
not err in its evaluation of the methods, conclusions, and principles relied upon by
Mizen in reaching his opinion and in concluding that M izen’s opinion met the
fundamental requirements of reliability and relevance o f Rule 702. See Gammill at
726. As distinguished from Gammill, the record in this case does not demonstrate
an “analytical gap” between M izen’s expert analysis and the data he relied upon in
making that analysis. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that
Mizen was qualified to testify as an expert witness. See Gammill at 727; General
Electric Co. v. Joiner , 522 U.S. 136, 118 S. Ct. 512, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1997).
The Supreme Court, however, reversed Nissan on other grounds and did not reach Nissan’s
challenge to plaintiffs expert’s qualifications, because Nissan failed to present that point in appeal.
In American Tourmaline Fields v. International Paper Co., supra , the plaintiff sued
International Paper for damages resulting from International Paper’s alleged repudiation o f a mineral
lease under which the plaintiff, as lessor, was granted the right by International Paper, as lessee, to
mine tourmaline. International Paper moved, pre-trial, to exclude the testimony o f the plaintiff s
damage expert, Tom Lee, who purported to be an expert in valuating mineral prospects based upon
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his thirty years of experience in the mining industry. International Paper urged the Court to apply
the Daubert factors since Lee's testimony involved what was, at its base, mining engineering
principles, which were scientific. The plaintiff, o f course, argued that the Daubert factors should
not be applied to judge the reliability of Lee’s “experience” based valuation method. The Court
granted International Paper’s motion and excluded Lee’s expert testimony.
Lee had no education as a mining engineer, but he allegedly had thirty years experience in
colored gem stone mining, trading, cutting, processing, valuation and exploration. Lee based his
damage calculations upon a method he claimed was well recognized in the mining industry. He also
claimed that he had used the method for other non-litigation valuations including valuations for the
diamond colossus, De Beers and Diamond Works, Although the Court was not convinced that the
plaintiff had shown that Lee was qualified to testify as to the valuation o f mining prospects, the
Court assumed, arguendo, that Lee was qualified as a valuation expert.
The Court held that its first task was to determine whether to apply the Daubert factors, or
other appropriate experienced based factors. The Court held that, since Lee’s valuation method
implicated mining engineering calculations, i.e., was science based, each o f the Daubert factors
applied to Lee’s testimony. The Court then discussed the Daubert factors and held that Lee’s
testimony did not pass any of those factors. Lee’s deposition testimony, and his general references
to his method appearing in mining publications, was insufficient. Lee’s testimony that his method
had been used for 40 years in a RTZ Operation mine in Africa, and that his method had been checked
by De Beers, was refuted by testimony offered by International Paper that Lee’s method was never
used at the RTZ Operation, and that Lee was never a consultant to RTZ. Lee also failed to prove the
accuracy, or rate of error, o f his valuation method. The Court held that Lee’s conclusory statement
that his method had a 95% accuracy rate in his work for RTZ was, likewise, not sufficient. Lee’s
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accuracy testimony was all the more suspect since International Paper had introduced evidence that
RTZ had never used Lee’s method. The plaintiff also failed to show that Lee’s valuation method
was subject to recognized standards and controls. Finally, the Court held that the plaintiff had not
argued, nor referred the Court to any evidence, that indicated that the scientific community at large
had accepted Lee’s valuation method as valid or reliable. Based upon the Court’s application of the

Daubert factors to the Lee valuation method, and the plaintiffs failure to meet it burden as to the
Daubert factors, the Court excluded Lee’s testimony as unreliable.
After excluding the p la in tiff's valuation expert, the defendant moved for summary judgment.
The Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the p lain tiff s claim
for breach of contract holding that:
Absent competent evidence, the court must conclude that ATF has not presented a
genuine issue o f material fact and that it cannot prove this measure of damages. The
court therefore grants summary judgment on ATF’s breach o f contract claim that is
based on the value o f the Lease.
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13153.

American Tourmaline Fields is a “textbook” case demonstrating the advantages the
challenging party enjoys if the Court applies the Daubert, or Robinson , factors to engineering or
quasi-scientific testimony rather than the Kumho, or Gammill, “analytical gap test.” Also, American

Tourmaline Fields highlights the importance o f verifying the challenged expert’s claims of
publication, use, and acceptance in the industry, o f his methodology.
The recent cases thus indicate that the “analytical gap test” is generally much easier to meet
than the Robinson/Daubert factors test.

Therefore, if possible, the party offering the expert

testimony should concentrate on showing the Court that the expert’s opinion rests upon the skill and
experience of the expert. The challenged expert, however, must close the gaps between the data, or
evidence, and his conclusion.
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a.

Exposing the Analytical Gap

To successfully challenge the well qualified “skill or experience” based expert, the opposing
party should demonstrate the following:
1.

The gaps between the data, or evidence, underlying the expert’s conclusion and the
data, or facts, actually proved in the case.

2.

The gaps between the actual data, or facts, in the case and the expert’s conclusions.
This is best demonstrated by applying the expert’s avowed method of analysis to the
data and showing that the expert’s conclusion either (i) does not necessarily follow
or (ii) by showing that the expert’s conclusion is only one of several conclusions that
can be derived from an analysis o f the data.

3.

That the expert’s conclusions are only one o f several possible explanations from an
analysis of the data, or facts, and that the expert has not ruled out, or accounted for,
the other explanations o f the data, or facts.

The challenged expert must systematically, step by step, demonstrate how each opinion is
supported by the data, or facts, and how the expert’s methodology applied to the data, or facts, yields
the expert’s opinion. The expert should also show that he has considered other possible explanations
o f the data, or facts, and how and why he has ruled out such other explanations. As the Supreme
Court stated in Gammill:
The “analytical gap” between the data in this case and Huston’s opinion was not
shown to be due to his techniques in assessing the vehicle restraint system. On the
contrary, Huston based his conclusions on observations and testing similar to those
employed by defendants’ experts. Rather, the “gap” in Huston’s analysis was his
failure to show how his observations, assuming they were valid, supported his
conclusions that Jaime was wearing her seat belt or that it was defective. The district
court was not required, in Joiner's words, “to admit opinion evidence which is
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit o f the expert.”
* * *
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Regarding defects in the restraint system design, Huston testified that the belt could loosen
and that the position of the push-button release was such that it could accidently be bumped in a
collision. Assuming Huston was correct, he has offered nothing to suggest that what he believes

could have happened actually did happen. His opinions are little more than “subjective belief or
unsupported speculation.” 972 S.W.2d at 727-28.
The best way to search for the analytical gaps in an oil and gas expert’s opinion is by detailed
and thorough discovery as to the challenged expert’s opinion and the basis for that opinion. That
discovery can be greatly aided by the use o f a consulting expert who can focus discovery so as to
fully detail the expert’s opinion, the facts underlying the opinion, and the method by which the
challenged expert analyzed those facts to arrive at his conclusion. The consulting expert should also
educate the challenging party’s attorney in the science, skill, or experience, underlying the challenged
expert’s opinion.

b.

Ruling Out Other Causes of the Event

If there are more than one cause, or explanation, for the event in issue, the expert must
systematically consider and rule out the other plausible causes o f the event. E.g., Gammill v. Jack

Williams Chevrolet, supra; and Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, supra . If there is
more than one cause, or explanation, for the occurrence of the event in issue, and the expert does not
rule out those other causes, his opinion should be excluded as unreliable. But, if the expert has
considered and reasonably ruled out the most obvious causes, the possibility o f some uneliminated
causes, however, goes to the weight of the testimony. Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129 (D.C.
Cir. 1996).
In Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486 (Tex. 2001), the challenged expert had not
ruled out other alternative causes of the plaintiffs’ stunted cotton crop. However, the Court of
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Appeals held that the alternate causes had been ruled out by the lay testimony o f farmers who
testified as to the cotton crops in the area. That is, the farmers' testimony rendered the defendant's
alternate cause implausible. Thus fortified with the extraneous testimony, the plaintiffs' expert
survived a Havner no evidence challenge in the Court o f Appeals. The Supreme Court, affirming
the Court of Appeals, held that the expert’s opinion was legally sufficient as to causation. The
Court, therefore, implicitly held that alternative causes can be ruled out by direct expert testimony
or evidence other than the expert’s opinion. In this manner, the expert's testimony, although
deficient under the Court's holding in Havner, was, coupled with the other evidence, legally
sufficient to support the judgment for the plaintiffs.
So why put such effort in to closing or exposing the analytical gap in the expert testimony
o f skill and experience experts? The next section discusses a recent Texas case in which the
petroleum engineering expert did not close the analytical gaps in a drainage case and a large
judgement for the lessor plaintiffs was reversed and judgment rendered for the lessee that plaintiffs
take nothing. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton , 133 S.W.3d 245 (Tex. 2004).

6.

Kerr-McGee v. Helton - Petroleum Engineering Expert’s Testimony - No
Evidence of Damages in a Drainage Case
Facts

Helton is a drainage case; it was tried to the Court without a jury. In Helton , Kerr-McGee,
as the operator, discovered the West Park Field in Wheeler County, Texas by drilling the discovery
well, the Holmes 17-1, which was completed in the Lower Puryear zone of the Upper Morrow
formation in the Anadarko Basin. The Holmes 17-1 was the first well in the area to find the Lower
Puryear formation. The Holmes 17-1 was completed in December 1993 - with 73 feet of net pay in
the Lower Puryear. The well was a prolific producer which produced at the rate o f approximately
8 M M cf per day and produced 8.7 B cf o f gas over its lifetime. Prior to drilling the discovery well,
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Kerr-McGee had taken a large block o f leases in the area, including leases covering the plaintiffs’
mineral interests in section 10, Block R.E., Roberts and Eddleman Survey. The plaintiffs’ leases
were north of, and contiguous to, section 17 in which Kerr-McGee drilled the Holmes 17-1. Figure
2 on page 49 is a plat of the field.
After drilling the discovery well, Kerr-McGee drilled an additional eight wells in the field,
but only four of those wells found the Lower Puryear, which is a channel sand and is, consequently,
hard to map and difficult to find. Kerr-McGee drilled two wells in section 10, the Mitchell 10-1 and
the Mitchell 10-2, however, neither well was near the Holmes 17-1. The Lower Puryear formation
was not present in the Mitchell 10-1 which was completed in August 1994 as the second well in the
field. After drilling additional wells, and completing a seismic survey o f the field, Kerr-McGee
spudded the Mitchell 10-2 in April 1996; the well encountered only 7 feet o f pay in the Lower
Puryear and it was completed in the Lower Puryear and two other zones. It is a marginal producer
and will not make a profit. The four wells completed in the Lower Puryear were the Holmes 17-1,
Eden 11-1, Mitchell 10-2 and the Fleetwood Trust 16-1. The Holmes 17-1 and the Fleetwood Trust
16-1 were completed in the thickest part of the Lower Puryear and were, by far, the best wells in the
field.
Even though Kerr-McGee drilled two wells on section 10, the plaintiffs, as lessors, filed suit
against Kerr-McGee, as lessee, alleging that Kerr-McGee breached its implied covenant to protect
section 10 from drainage by the Holmes 17-1 and Fleetwood Trust 16-1 wells. Plaintiffs alleged that
a reasonably prudent operator would have drilled a protection well (“Protection Well") on section
10, at a location 467 feet from the southern boundary line and 660 feet from the western boundary
line of section 10 and would have had the Protection Well on production by February 1, 1995.
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Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Testimony
At trial, the plaintiffs’ petroleum geologist expert, Dr. Dennis Kerr, testified that the Lower
Puryear formation that was productive in the Holmes 17-1 and Fleetwood Trust 16-1 extended north
under section 10, and that the Protection Well would have encountered approximately 60 feet of pay
in the Lower Puryear at that location. Kerr-McGee did not dispute Dr. K err’s geologic testimony.
To establish liability and damages, the plaintiffs offered the testimony o f Michael Riley, a petroleum
engineering graduate of the University o f Texas, who had very extensive experience in the Anadarko
Basin. Riley testified as to the volumes o f gas the Production Well would have produced had KerrMcGee drilled the well.

Riley also testified that the Protection Well would have produced

approximately 6.1 Bcf of gas and would have returned a large profit over the cost o f drilling,
completing, and operating the well, thus, a reasonably prudent operator would have drilled the well
and had it on production by February 1,1995. Riley testified that, as o f the beginning o f 2001, KerrMcGee had drained approximately 3.1 B cf o f gas from the Lower Puryear formation underlying the
plaintiffs’ leases in section 10.
Riley offered, and it was received into evidence without objection, plaintiffs’ exhibit 21,
which was a tabulation of the income stream that the Protection Well would have generated. Exhibit
21 was based upon plaintiffs’ exhibit 16, which was a forecast o f the production for the Protection
Well which was also admitted into evidence without objection from Kerr-McGee. Riley opined that
the Protection Well should have gone on production by February 1,1995 at the rate o f 8 M M cf per
day, which was the same rate of production as the Holmes 17-1. Riley testified that the Protection
Well would have declined to a rate of 4 M M cf per day by February 1997 when the Fleetwood Trust
16-1 went on production. Riley testified that he used engineering principles to project the production
and income from the Protection Well, including P/Z analysis o f the reservoir. Based upon exhibits
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16 and 21, Riley testified that the Protection Well would have produced approximately 6.1 B cf o f
gas and would have generated $2,149,299.60 to the plaintiffs’ 3/16th royalty interest in section 10,
which in Riley’s opinion, is the amount o f damages that the plaintiffs suffered as a result o f KerrM cGee’s failure to drill the Protection Well.
Plaintiffs’ exhibits 16 and 21, were, thus, used to establish both liability and damages.
Specifically, the exhibits were used to establish liability by showing that the Protection Well would
have generated a reasonable profit - above the cost o f drilling, completing, and operating the well,
and marketing the hydrocarbons produced therefrom. The exhibits were then used to calculate the
plaintiffs’ damages based upon the royalty measure o f damages, i. e., the royalties that the plaintiffs
would have received had the Protection Well have been drilled by February 1, 1995.
Kerr-McGee did not object to Riley’s direct testimony, or the plaintiffs offer o f his exhibits.
On cross examination by Kerr-McGee’s attorney, Riley testified that:
Q.

A s a Petroleum Engineer, Mr. Riley, assuming all factors are equal, except
the thickness of the reservoir, would the wells produce at the same rate?

A.

Not assuming all things are equal, no.

Q.

So, if everything is equal, except the thickness o f the reservoir, the thick
reservoir is going to produce at a higher rate. The well in the thicker
reservoir is going to produce at a higher rate, isn’t it?

A.

Yes.
* * *

Q.

All right. Well, we know that Holmes and Fleetwood had different
thicknesses of reservoirs, don’t we?

A.

That is correct.

Q.

A.

And we know from the production histories that they produced at a different
rate —
That is correct.
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Q.

—don't we? So, how is it then, that you theorize that this hypothetical well
with an unknown thickness o f formation, would produce at the same rate as
Holmes and Fleetwood?

A.

Because not all other things are equal.
***

Q.

If it's thinner, then it’s certainly not going to produce at the same rate, is it?

A.

I can't say that for sure. There are other factors in the reservoir. Your water
saturation affects your permeability. Your skin damage from the invasion o f
drilling fluids into the well bore can drastically affect your flow capacity o f
the well.

Q.

And the porosity would certainly affect it, w ouldn't it?

A.

The porosity is somewhat linked to the permeability —
* * *

Q.

A well with 18% porosity would not produce at a greater rate than one with
10% porosity?

A.

As I stated earlier, there seems to be a - appear to be a relationship between
permeability and porosity and it is not the porosity that causes the increase in
production. It’s the permeability.

Q.

Well, whatever that is, we don't know any o f that about this hypothetical
well, do we?

A.

No.

Q.

So you don’t have any of those factors as real factors upon which to base
your theory, that it would have produced at the same rate as Holmes and
Fleetwood, do you?

A.

We have some indications.

Q.

But you don’t have any real data, do you?

A.

Not on the hypothetical well.

Q.

All of it has to be based on assumptions, doesn’t it?

A.

Yes. (Emphasis added).
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Q.

And none of those assumptions are supportable, that is, you cannot verify any
of those assumptions, can you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Which ones can you verify?

A.

I was able to verify the skin damage in the Holmes 17-1.

Q.

But you don't know whether there would be any skin damage in the
hypothetical well, do you?

A.

No.

Q

So you can’t verify that it would have the same skin damage problem that the
Holmes well had, can you?

A.

No.

Q.

Was there any other factor that you think you can verify?

A.

No.

Q.

All right. So, the net result is that, as to your opinion as to the productivity
of the hypothetical well, is purely assumptions based upon no empirical data,
isn’t it?

A.

No empirical data, yes.

Q.

Yes. So it’s not founded upon any fact, provable fact, is it, Mr. Riley?

A.

Yes, I think there are some provable facts.

Q.

Well, which ones are they?That’s what I’m trying to find out. What is the
provable fact upon which you can base that opinion?

A.

Thefact that the Holmes has significant skin damage to it?

Q.

But you just got through admitting that you don’t know whether the
hypothetical well would have any skin damage, or not, do you? D idn’t you
admit that?

A.

Yes.
***
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Q,

So we know nothing about what this hypothetical well would have in that
respect do we?

A.

The an sw e r-

Q.

Excuse me. Do we, or do we not?

A.

No.
***

Q.

Now then, I am searching for any provable fact, a fact as to which you
have proof upon which you can base your opinion as to the productivity
of the hypothetical well.

A.

I do not know the productivity of the hypothetical well.

Q.

But that’s what you based your entire damage calculations on in this
case, is that that well would have produced 6.1 Bcf of gas had it been
drilled and commencedproduction as of February1,1995, isn’t it?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And you have absolutely no factual data upon which to support that
opinion, do you Mr. Riley?

A.

There are —the only fact I have to base that on is what the wells in the
immediate area are producing.

Q.

Okay. And that does not tell you what the hypothetical well would have
produced, does it?

A.

No, it does not.

Q.

All right. So back to my statement a moment ago, and to be completely
honest, and I think you are, that you simply do not have any factual
basis for projecting the production of that hypothetical well, do you?

A.

That is correct.

Q.

Okay. It’s purely unsupported assumption, orestimation, isn’t it?

A.

No. (Emphasis added).
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Kerr-McGee’s Motion to Strike Riley’s Testimony
Immediately after its cross examination of Riley, Kerr-McGee moved the court to strike the
damage testimony of Riley, because that testimony was not based upon any competent evidence, was
unreliable, and, hence, inadmissible, under Robinson . The trial court overruled Kerr-McGee’s
motion to strike Riley’s testimony. The plaintiffs recalled Riley twice - once during Plaintiffs’ casein-chief and once in rebuttal. On redirect o f Riley, the plaintiffs established that the Holmes 17-1
had formation damage known as “skin damage,” and that such skin damage was caused during the
drilling of the well. Riley further testified that, as a result o f the knowledge it learned drilling the
discovery well, Kerr-McGee changed its drilling program, so as, to avoid skin damage o f subsequent
wells. Riley testified that by the time that Kerr-McGee should have drilled the Protection Well, that
well could have been drilled without skin damage. Therefore, the Protection Well should have
produced at the same rate as the Holmes 17-1.

Kerr-McGee’s Expert Testimony
Kerr-McGee called four expert witnesses regarding liability, including Ronald Platt, a
petroleum engineer, who opined that the Holmes 17-1 had not drained a substantial amount o f gas
from underneath section 10. He also testified that a reasonably prudent operator would not have
drilled the Protection Well, because it would not have returned a profit and, indeed, would not have
recovered the costs of drilling and completing the well, which costs were approximately $ 1,500,000.
Platt testified that the original gas in place in the Lower Puryear reservoir was 17.8 Bcf, that the
original gas in place in the Lower Puryear beneath section 10 was only .4 Bcf; and that the value of
the recoverable gas in the Lower Puryear beneath section 10 was only $640,000. The other experts
called by Kerr-McGee also testified that a reasonably prudent operator would not have drilled the
Protection Well.
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Trial Court’s Judgment for Plaintiffs
After the close of all of the evidence, Kerr-McGee moved for judgment arguing that the
plaintiffs had wholly failed to sustain their burden o f proof as to the amount o f damages and that
there was no competent evidence from which damages could be computed. The trial court, however,
found for the plaintiffs, and entered judgment for the plaintiffs in the amount o f $1,432,618.11,
which included $378,900 in attorneys’ fees and $190,068.75 o f prejudgment interest. In support o f
its judgment, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions o f law, inter alia , that:
a.

Kerr-McGee breached the implied covenant to protect the plaintiffs’ leases in section
10 from substantial drainage;

b.

The Holmes 17-1 drained substantial volumes o f gas from underneath section 10
during 1994;

c.

A reasonably prudent operator would have drilled a protection well 660 feet from the
West line and 467 feet from the South line o f section 10 and had that well on
production by February 1, 1995; and

d.

The hypothetical protection well would have paid out in a reasonable time and would
have made a reasonable profit for the lessee after deducting the cost o f drilling,
completing, operating and marketing.

Based upon these findings, the trial court awarded plaintiffs $863,649.36 in lost royalties $840,910.51 in royalties from February 1, 1995 to March 16, 2001 and $22,738.85 for future
damages after March 16, 2001. Kerr-McGee moved to modify the judgment, and moved for a new
trial; the motions were overruled. Kerr-McGee, thereafter, perfected its appeal.

Court of Appeals Affirms the Trial Court
In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that Riley’s testimony was admissible,
but the Court of Appeals did not formally analyze that testimony under Rule 702, Robinson and its
progeny.

In support of its holding, the Court o f Appeals cited Southeastern Pipe Line Co. v.

Tichacek, 977 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 997 S.W.2d
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166 (Tex, 1999)(a drainage case) and reasoned that:

.. while Riley’s opinion may not be absolute,

we believe there is some factual basis to support his opinion as to the amount o f damages. The
determination as to the credibility of that opinion is to be made by the trier o f fact.”

The Supreme Court Reverses the Courts Below
The Supreme Court granted Kerr-McGee’s petition for review and reversed both courts
below, and held that the plaintiffs damage proof was unreliable and inadmissible under Rule 702,
and Robinson , and would not support the judgment for plaintiffs. The Supreme Court, therefore,
reversed the judgment, and rendered judgment that the plaintiffs take nothing.

Procedural Issues as to Robinson Challenge
In support of the judgment, the plaintiffs asserted that Kerr-McGee had waived its objections
to the testimony of Riley by the following:
a.

Failing to object to the testimony of Riley prior to the offer o f such testimony,
plaintiffs asserted that Riley’s testimony should have been challenged before trial, or
at latest, before the offer o f such testimony -preferably by the defendant taking Riley
on voir dire and moving to exclude Riley’s challenged testimony immediately
thereafter; and

b.

Failing to object to the admission o f plaintiffs exhibits numbers 16 and 21, which
exhibits estimated the production and revenue stream from the Protection Well.

Plaintiffs argued that Rule 705(b) required that, to preserve error, Kerr-McGee should have
conducted a voir dire examination of Riley, and should have objected to his testimony before it was
admitted into evidence. The Supreme Court held that Kerr-McGee had not waived its objection to
Riley’s testimony by making that objection after cross examination o f Riley. Citing Maritime

Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. 1998) and Guadalupe-Bianco River Authority v.
Kraft, 77 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. 2002), the Court reasoned that Kerr-M cGee’s objection was made in
sufficient time to allow the plaintiffs to meet that objection and to carry their burden proving the
reliability o f that damage testimony. The Court in Maritime Overseas Corp. held that to preserve
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error a party must object to the evidence before trial or when the evidence is offered; the Court did
not consider whether a motion to strike after cross examination was sufficient to preserve error.
Further, it held only that an objection, made for the first time after the jury verdict, comes too late.
In Kraft, the Court held that an objection made when the witness began his testimony was timely.
The Court, therefore, held that Kerr-McGee was not required to object to Riley’s testimony before
trial. Further, the Court held that Kerr-McGee objected to Riley’s testimony immediately after cross
examination, when the basis for the objection became apparent to Kerr-McGee. The Court reasoned
that, since the plaintiffs had ample time to address Kerr-McGee’s objections to Riley’s testimony but had not done so, the plaintiffs were not subjected to “trial or appeal by ambush.” The Court held
that Kerr-McGee’s motion to strike, made after the cross examination o f Riley, was timely and
sufficient to preserve its no evidence complaint on appeal.
Plaintiffs argued that even if Kerr-McGee’s objection was timely, that objection was limited,
because Kerr-McGee had only objected to the unreliable factual foundation o f Riley’s damage
testimony.

Kerr-McGee had, therefore, not properly objected to Riley’s methodology, which

methodology objection Kerr-McGee was raising on appeal. The Supreme Court held that KerrM cGee’s objection was proper and had preserved its challenge to both the facts, or data, and the
methodology by which Riley arrived at his opinions. Moreover, the Court found that Kerr-McGee
did not waive its challenge to Riley’s testimony by failing to object to the admissibility of plaintiffs’
exhibits 16 and 21. The Court reasoned that those exhibits were merely representations o f Riley’s
opinions and would, therefore, be no evidence if Riley’s opinions were not otherwise reliable and
admissible.
In a tactical move, Kerr-McGee admitted - for the purposes o f argument - that the trial court’s
liability findings, other than the amount of damages, were supported by legally sufficient evidence.
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Nonetheless, Kerr-McGee argued that the plaintiffs had failed to prove the damage element o f their
drainage cause o f action, because the only damage testimony was Riley’s testimony, which testimony
was inadmissible.

Specifically, Kerr-McGee asserted that Riley himself had admitted that his

damage calculation was speculative and not based upon any factual data - just his unsupported
opinion as to the volumes of gas the hypothetical Protection Well would have produced. KerrMcGee, therefore, asserted that there was no basis, in fact, for Riley’s opinion as to the production
rate of the Protection Well and, hence, no evidence to support the trial court’s damage award. KerrMcGee has asserted that, since the Lower Puryear sand in the location o f the Protection Well was
60 feet thick, and the sand was 73 feet thick in the Holmes 17-1 and 79 feet thick in the Fleetwood
16-1, all things being equal, the Protection Well, producing from a thinner portion o f the reservoir,
would have had a lower rate of production than the other 2 wells. Indeed, Riley admitted as much
in his cross examination. Further, Kerr-McGee reasoned that Riley’s assumption that the Protection
Well would produce at the same rate as the Holmes 17-1 was contrary to actual facts since the
Fleetwood Trust 16-1, the other good well in the reservoir, did not even produce at the same rate as
the Holmes 17-1. Kerr-McGee did not dispute that the Protection Well would produce from the
Lower Puryear at some reduced rate; rather, the issue was how much the Protection Well would
produce.

The Basis for Riley’s Testimony as to the Protection Well
Riley testified that he looked at numerous accepted sources, such as well logs, base maps,
production information, RRC records, and scout cards, to obtain data about the area and the wells
surrounding the proposed location of the Protection Well.
The plaintiffs argued, however, that there were several facts that justified Riley’s opinion as
to the production rate, and his projected revenue stream, from the Protection Well - specifically:
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a.

it was reasonable to assume that the Protection Well would have a rate as high as the
Holmes 17-1 because it had “skin damage,” which skin damage could have been, and
would have been, prevented in drilling o f the Protection Well; and

b.

The Protection Well would have been 25 feet structurally higher than the Holmes 171 and, therefore, would have watered out later, and produced longer, than the Holmes
17-1.

Riley, however, did not specify how any of these factors affected his opinion and calculations o f the
reserves and production rate of the Protection Well. Also, Riley failed to testify as to his estimate
of the porosity and permeability of the Lower Puryear reservoir in the vicinity o f the Protection Well
and what effect, if any, the porosity and permeability would have on his calculations.

The Analytical Gap in Riley’s Damage Opinions
After citing Robinson, and other recent Rule 702 cases, including Gammill v. Jack Williams

Chevrolet, Inc, 972 S.W. 2d 713 (Tex. 1998), the Court reaffirmed that expert testimony is unreliable
and inadmissible if the Court concludes that “there is simply too great an analytical gap between the
data and the opinion proffered.” The Court also noted that, long before Robinson, Texas courts had
required that evidence o f drainage be based upon more than mere speculation. See, Texas Pacific

Coal & Oil Co. v Barker, 6 S.W.2d 1031 (Tex. 1928).

The Court further stated that while

estimating the production from a hypothetical protection well would, necessarily, involve
circumstantial evidence, the “amount and value o f oil or gas production, obtained or obtainable
through reasonable diligence, must be definitely alleged, and must be proven with reasonable
certainty before damages may be allowed.” Citing Barker at 1034. The Court further reasoned that,
just as in any case seeking lost profits, recovery o f those lost profits does not require exact
calculation, but, at a minimum, opinions or calculations of lost profits must be based upon objective
facts, figures, or data.

60

The Court held that although Riley had listed several facts that supported his opinion on the
rate of production of the protection well, Riley failed to demonstrate how those factors supported
his opinion. In that regard, the Court stated that:

Thus, although Riley examined facts and data that would be appropriate in
reaching an opinion as to damages, there is no explanation of how these factors
affected his calculations, if at all. As the United States Supreme Court has said:
“Nothing in either Daubert or the F e d e r a l R u l e s of E v id e n c e requires a . . . court
to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit
o f the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered.” General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997).
Helton argues that other cases hold that plaintiffs in drainage cases can rely on
data from existing wells to establish production of a hypothetical offset well.
[Citations omitted]. Kerr-McGee does not dispute that data from existing wells
may be considered in predicting a hypothetical well’s production. But without
knowing how Riley used that and other data to reach his conclusions in this
case, we cannot determine whether Riley’s analysis was reliable. Moreover,
Riley failed to sufficiently explain why known differences in the wells, such as
the thickness of the Lower Puryear reservoir encountered, would not result in
different production rates.
In sum, even if the data Riley used is the type generally relied upon by
petroleum engineers to estimate production, and even if the underlying facts
and data Riley used are accurate, there is simply too great an analytical gap
between the data and Riley’s conclusions for the conclusions to be reliable and
therefore some evidence. Because Riley’s testimony regarding the amount of
damages is incompetent, there is no evidence to support the amount of damages
awarded by the trial court. (Emphasis added).
There was just too large an “analytical gap” between the facts upon which Mr. Riley based
his damage testimony and his opinions. The Court, therefore, held that the testimony was unreliable,
and was, therefore, inadmissible, and should have been struck by the trial court. Since there was no
evidence o f the plaintiffs’ damages, the Court reversed the judgment, refused to remand the case for
a new trial in the interest of justice, and rendered judgment that the plaintiffs take nothing.
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Lessons from Kerr-McGee v. Helton
As with most geologic, and petroleum engineering testimony, the opinions are often based
as much upon experience as upon science. Therefore, the Robinson factors for testing reliability o f
expert scientific testimony are generally not applicable. Nonetheless, such geologic and engineering
testimony is subject to the strictures of Rule 702 and, to be admissible, must be relevant and reliable
- ju s t as is required for the admissibility o f purely scientific testimony. The Court in Helton did not
plow any new ground, it merely applied existing authority as to the admissibility o f expert testimony.
It is, however, vitally important to closely study the Court’s application o f existing authority to the
admissibility of oil and gas expert testimony. It is the first case in which the Court has applied

Robinson to the testimony of an oil and gas expert. Listed below are some o f the lessons from
Helton.
The Analytical Gap Analysis
As discussed above, virtually all geologic and petroleum engineering opinions are based upon
experience and science. The factors for determining reliability announced in Robinson/Daubert are
more properly applicable to purely scientific testimony and are, often, not very helpful in testing the
relevance and reliability of geologic and petroleum engineering testimony. Rather, the courts will,
most likely, use the “analytical gap” analysis announced in Gammill and Joiner.
Thus, the testifying expert must not only prove the relevant facts supporting the testimony,
he must specifically establish how those facts support his opinion. Conversely, the opponent o f such
testimony must isolate the facts, and show that the challenged expert has not shown how those facts
support his opinion, and, therefore, show that there is an “analytical gap” between the facts and the
expert’s opinion.

Stated differently, to be admissible, the expert m ust specifically show,

quantitatively if at all possible, how the facts, or his assumptions, support his opinion. If the expert
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merely lists the facts or assumptions, and does not show, specifically, how those facts, and
assumptions, support the opinion, that opinion is not admissible - irrespective o f the level o f
competence and experience o f the testifying expert.
By way of example, Riley could have calculated the skin effect suffered in the Holmes 17-1
and shown how the absence of that skin effect in the Protection Well would have improved the
expected production rates from the Protection Well. Likewise, Riley might have calculated by
volumetric reserve calculations, the additional reserves the Protection Well would have recovered
as a result o f its 25 feet higher structural position to the Holmes 17-1. These suggestions are, o f
course, based upon 20-20 hind sight.

7.

M itchell Energy Corp. v. Bartlett - Petroleum Engineering Expert’s
Testimony - No Evidence of Causation

In Mitchell Energy v. Bartlett, 958 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied),
the plaintiffs sought damages for contamination o f their groundwater allegedly resulting from twelve
o f Mitchell Energy’s gas wells located in the Boonsville Bend Conglomerate Gas Field, Wise
County, Texas. The plaintiffs introduced the expert testimony o f a petroleum engineer, Joe Neal,
and a geochemist, Dr. Randy Bassett, to prove that the plaintiffs’ groundwater, and the Mitchell gas
wells, contained hydrogen sulfide, and that the hydrogen sulfide in the plaintiffs’ groundwater came
from M itchell’s gas wells. Mitchell timely objected to that expert testimony. The jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiffs awarding actual damages and awarding the plaintiffs $200,000,000 in
punitive damages. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs based upon that verdict.
Mitchell appealed; the Court o f Appeals reversed and rendered judgment that the plaintiffs take
nothing from Mitchell.

Mitchell is the only reported Texas case in which an oil and gas expert, a petroleum engineer,
has been subjected to a Robinson review. The Court o f Appeals did not explain, or discuss, the
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deficiencies, if any, o f N eal’s data, techniques, methodology or opinions. Rather, the Court held that
the opinions expressed by Neal were no evidence o f causation. In that regard, the Court stated that:
But Neal did not testify that gas from Mitchell’s wells was found in any o f appellees’
water. More importantly, Neal did not testify that either Mitchell’s wells or
appellees’ water supply contained hydrogen sulfide. Thus, N eal’s testimony is no
evidence that hydrogen sulfide from Mitchell’s gas wells migrated into appellees’
water supply and caused their injuries.
The Court further held that Dr. Bassett’s opinions were unreliable and did not meet the requirements
of Rule 702 or Robinson. Hence, Dr. Bassett’s testimony was no evidence of causation. Dr. Bassett
had testified that he “concluded to a reasonable degree o f certainty” that hydrogen sulfide was found
in plaintiffs’ water. He also testified that it was “very clear that hydrogen sulfide is a natural
component in the Mitchell gas.” Dr. Bassett, however, would not say that the Mitchell wells were
the “probable” source o f the hydrogen sulfide; he equivocated and testified only that the hydrogen
sulfide “certainly could have come” from Mitchell’s gas wells. The Court held that Bassett’s use
of the “magic” words “reasonable degree o f scientific certainty” alone will not establish causation.
The Court stated that “unless the expert provides supporting facts, his bare conclusion is not
evidence.” Id. at 447.
Further, the Court, citing Robinson, held that the scientific method requires that an expert
consider, and rule out, alternative causes. Specifically, the Court stated:
In addition, evidence was presented at trial that the hydrogen sulfide in appellees’
water wells could have been caused by bacterial introduced on the surface o f the
wells (rather than by gas migrating into the aquifer). Dr. Bassett did not rule out the
possibility that surface bacteria could have caused the hydrogen sulfide in appellees’
wells. An expert who is trying to find the cause o f something should carefully
consider and rule out alternative causes. See Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 559. Dr.
Bassett’s failure to rule out other causes o f the presence o f hydrogen sulfide in
appellees’ water renders his opinion “little more than speculation.” Id. Mere guess
or conjecture is not probative evidence. McClure, 608 S.W.2d at 903.
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Because Dr. Bassett did not present more than a scintilla of evidence that hydrogen
sulfide was present in Mitchell’s gas wells, and because Dr. Bassett did not rule out
the other possible causes of hydrogen sulfide in appellees’ water, his testimony is no
evidence that hydrogen sulfide from Mitchell’s wells had polluted appellees’ water.
Consequently, there is no evidence that Mitchell’s conduct caused appellees’ injuries,
and appellees are not entitled to recover any damages from Mitchell.
958 S.W.2d at 448.

C.

Closing or Exposing the Analytical Gap in Geologic and Petroleum Engineering
Testimony

The backbone o f most drainage, development, and pooling cases is geologic maps that show
the location and distribution of the reservoir in issue. These maps include fault plane maps, structure
maps, and net pay isopachous maps. With the isopachous map, the geologist or engineer can
calculate the bulk reservoir rock volume and its distribution through the field. Without such maps,
it is very unlikely that a plaintiff could prevail in a drainage, development, or pooling case. Seismic
maps are also useful in determining field boundaries and major faults. There are many computer
programs now in use by geologists that generate, or draw, structure maps and isopachous maps. If
any such programs are used, the accuracy and admissibility of those programs must be proved up just
as any other computer generated evidence would be proved up at trial.
In turn, the backbone of the geologic maps are well logs from which the geologist picks
formation tops, picks faults, and from which net sand thicknesses are derived. The results of this log
analysis should be reduced to tabular form showing fault cuts, sand tops, and bottoms, and net sand
thickness for each well. Once these figures are placed on a surface map, the requisite geologic maps
can be derived. The proponent of the map should verify that the picks from the well logs are
accurate. If these picks are not accurate, and are haphazardly done, they may well render all the
maps based thereon unreliable, and if challenged, inadmissible.
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Once the geologist has prepared the requisite maps o f gross reservoir rock volume, a reservoir
engineer must determine the porosity and water saturation o f the reservoir, which is normally a
weighted average calculation based upon the values derived from the individual well logs penetrating
the reservoir in issue. Generally these porosity and water saturation picks are tabulated and shown
for each well. Based upon the weighted average porosity, and water saturation, o f the reservoir, the
reservoir engineer then calculates the hydrocarbon pore volume o f the reservoir, calculates and
applies the appropriate formation volume factor, and then determines the original oil and gas in place
in a reservoir. The engineer can then determine and apply the appropriate recovery factor to the
original oil and gas in place to determine the reserves. This method o f calculating reserves and the
distribution of those reserves beneath the field is called the volumetric method.
In certain types of reservoirs, if there is adequate production history, and bottom hole
pressure data available, the reservoir engineer may calculate the reserves by the “material balance"
method. Although this method may be used to determine original gas in place and reserves, the
material balance method cannot calculate the distribution o f those reserves, or establish field
boundaries. It should, however, be used as a check against the original gas in place and reserves
calculated by the volumetric method. Thus, if the reserves calculated by the volumetric method
match closely to the reserves calculated by the material balance method, that match shows that the
geologic mapping, and reservoir properties used in the volumetric method, are more likely correct.
If there is not a match, and the material balance calculation is based upon sufficient production
history, and reliable bottom hole pressures, this shows that the geologic mapping and/or the reservoir
properties of porosity and water saturation are inaccurate, and thus unreliable, and if challenged,
probably inadmissible. Material balance calculations of reserves are, however, not reliable in many
tight formation reservoirs or water drive reservoirs.
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General Limitations as to All Engineering and Geologic Methods and Diagnostic Tools
Virtually every geologic, or engineering, method o f prediction, or calculation, and all
diagnostic tools, have certain limitations and ranges o f accuracy.

Consequently, a careful

practitioner will determine those limitations, and the effect, if any, o f those limitations on the
accuracy of the geologic, or engineering, method or the diagnostic tool. Likewise, the party opposing
admission should also carefully examine those limitations, and if they render the method, or
diagnostic tool, unreliable, those limitations should be explored in discovery, and at a Robinson
hearing, or at trial, and a challenge made based thereon.
As Helton so graphically teaches, the day o f the eminently qualified oil and gas expert taking
the stand, generally listing the factors and information he has considered, and then rendering his
opinion based thereon, without showing how those facts support his opinion, are over. A plaintiff
who puts on such evidence, even if admitted at trial over the objection o f an opposing party, does
so at the peril of being reversed on appeal.
Most oil and gas cases, particularly implied covenant cases, involve expert engineering and
geologic testimony. The opinions of those experts will be subject to far greater scrutiny than in the
past. Many o f the “all around experts” who have testified as to everything from a “blow out” to the
calculation of reserves in abnormally pressured deep gas reservoirs will likely face stiff Robinson
challenges testing their true expertise as to the specific fact issue in dispute and the reliability o f their
opinions. Further, experts who attempt to make novel uses o f existing theories and techniques will
be required to support their opinions with more than their statement that “it is so because I say it is
so based upon my education, training and experience.”
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V.

CONCLUSIONS
There are a wide and varied number o f disputes that can arise during the exploration, drilling

and development of an oil and gas prospect. Almost each o f the relationships in the exploration,
development and production phases o f a prospect are governed by contract.

It is, therefore,

axiomatic that the drafting and administration o f those contracts is paramount. In those disputes that
arise, they almost certainly will require expert testimony on the issues of liability and damages. In
evaluating the seriousness of such disputes, it is very helpful to consider very basic concepts of
“causation.” That is, did the conduct X actually cause event Y, and can the claimant prove that
causation with a qualified expert offering reliable testimony that will pass the muster o f Daubert
There is truly a major sea change underway in technical litigation brought about by the courts
substantially raising of the standard for the admissibility o f expert testimony. In Texas, and in
Arkansas and other jurisdictions, that sea change is well underway and will effect virtually every oil
and gas dispute. Whether, or not, to pursue an oil and gas dispute, and how to efficiently prosecute,
or defend, that oil and gas dispute, turns, in large part, upon marshaling expert testimony and an
accurate prediction o f whether, or not, such testimony will be admissible under Daubert and its
progeny.
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ATTACHMENT 1
No. 2005-9999
COMPANY A,
PLAINTIFF,
VS.
COMPANY B,
DEFENDANT.

§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

REATTA COUNTY, TEXAS

1st JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COMPANY B’S APPLICATION
FOR APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW the Defendant, Company B, and files this Application for Appointment of
a Receiver. In support of the Application, Company B would respectfully show the Court as
follows:
NATURE OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION
AND THE PROCEEDING BEFORE THE COURT
1.

This is an oil and gas case involving a dispute between two of the working interest

owners in the Prospect in Reatta County, Texas. Company B and the Plaintiff, Company A, both
own working interests in the Prospect. Company B acquired its working interest from Company
C. The general partner of Company C, Company D, was named as operator of the Prospect
under the Joint Operating Agreement (“JOA”) that governs operations in the Prospect. Upon
Company B’s purchase of the Company C’s working interest in the Prospect, the Company C
entities no longer owned any working interest in the prospect and, thus, no longer qualified to
serve as the operator of the Prospect. Company C turned operations in the Prospect to Company
B.

2.

Since the time of the sale, neither Company B nor Company A has received the necessary

majority vote of the working interest owners to succeed Company C as operator. Company A
brought this action seeking an injunction against Company B conducting further operations in
the Prospect.

As Company C has turned operations over to Company B and no successor

operator has been elected, the Prospect will be without an operator if the Court grants an
injunction.

The wells in the Prospect must have an operator to continue producing and

maintaining the oil, gas and mineral leases in the Prospect. Without an operator, the interests of
Company A, Company B, and the other working interest owners will be materially damaged. To
avoid damages and losses to the working interests owners, the Court should appoint a receiver to
act as operator of the Prospect until a successor operator is elected under the JOA.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3.

The Prospect contains several oil, gas and mineral leases in Reatta County. Company

A’s predecessor, Company E, along with Company X originally generated and developed the
Prospect.
4.

When the working interest owners formed the Prospect, they executed the JOA. This

JOA names Company C as the operator of the Prospect. Under the terms of the JOA, the
operator has full control of all operations in the Prospect until that operator either is removed or
resigns. The JOA further provides in Article V.B.:
1. Resignation or Removal of Operator: Operator may resign at any time
by giving written notice thereof to Non-Operators.
If Operator
terminates its legal existence, no longer owns an interest hereunder in
the Contract Area, or is no longer capable of serving as Operator,
Operator shall be deemed to have resigned without any action by
Non-Operators, except the selection o f a successor.
* * *
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Such resignation or removal shall not become effective under 7:00
o’clock A.M. on the first day of the calendar month following the
expiration of ninety (90) days after the giving of notice of resignation by
Operator or action by the Non-Operators to remove Operator, unless a
successor Operator has been selected and assumes the duties of Operator
at an earlier date.
* * *

2. Selection of Successor Operator: Upon the resignation or removal of
Operator under a provision of this agreement, a successor Operator shall
be selected by the parties. The successor Operator shall be selected from
the parties owning an interest in the Contract Area at the time such
successor Operator is selected. The successor Operator shall be selected
from the parties owning an interest in the Contract Area at the time such
successor Operator is selected. The successor Operator shall be selected
by the affirmative vote of two (2) or more parties owning a majority
interest based on ownership . . . . (Emphasis added).
5.

On November 5, 2004, Company B acquired the working interest of Company C

effective September 1, 2004. Under the Operating Agreement, Company C could no longer
serve as operator, because the Company C entities no longer owned a working interest in the
Prospect. Company C handed over operations to Company B after the closing of this sale.
However, Company C is still contractually the operator under the terms of the JOA. See Purvis
Oil Corp. v. Hillin, 890 S.W.2d 931, 936 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, no writ)(holding that the
“except the selection of a successor” language in an operating agreement “makes it apparent that
action by the non-operators is required, namely they must select a successor operator before the
operator will be deemed to have resigned”).
6.

Subsequent to the sale of Company C’s working interest, both Company B and Company

A have solicited the votes of the other working interest owners for election as successor operator.
Company B has voted for itself as operator, and Company A has voted for itself. Company B
owns a 34.75% working interest in the Prospect, and Company A owns 32.5% of the working
interest. Therefore, neither Company B nor Company A has been able to obtain a vote of the
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majority of the working interest owners. To date, the remaining working interest owners have
failed and refused to vote for either Company A or Company B.
7.

Prior to the sale to Company B, Company C sent out Authorities for Expenditures letters

(“AFEs”) for operations in the Prospect. The AFEs proposed three operations: (a) the drilling of
the Gasser No. 3 Well; (b) the completion of the Gasser No. 2 Well; and (c) a workover on the
Gasser No. 1/Gasser Ranch No. 11 Well. Company A received these AFEs and consented to all
three operations.
8.

Company C proposed the drilling of the Gasser No. 3 Well for several reasons. First,

some of the acreage in the Prospect is subject to leases that contain continuous operations
clauses. These leases contain a ninety (90) day deadline for the resumption of drilling activities.
Also, three lessors in the Prospect demanded that the working interest owners drill an offset well
to prevent the drainage of the lessors’ land by the Gasser No. 1 Well. Finally, Big Oil owns a
lease adjoining the Prospect and is drilling a well on that lease. Given these circumstances,
Company C believed it prudent to drill the Gasser No. 3 Well. Company A apparently agreed, as
it consented to the drilling of this well.
9.

Before Company B purchased Company C’s working interest, Company C had

commenced operations on the Gasser No. 3 Well. It contracted with Patterson UTI Drilling for
a drilling rig. Company C also built the location for the Gasser No. 3 Well, which location had
been disclosed in the AFE and approved by the working interest owners, including Company A.
10.

After closing its purchase of Company C’s working interest, Company B took over the

drilling operations on the Gasser No. 3 Well. It contracted for the same drilling rig and rig
services contracted for by Company C and proceeded to drill the well on the location built by
Company C. At this time, Company B is approximately one-third of the way through what is
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projected to be a 43-day drilling operation. The well has been drilled to approximately one-half
of its 16,500 foot projected total depth.
11.

In addition to continuing the operators on the Gasser No. 3 Well, Company B has also

conducted facility maintenance and operations on the Gasser No. 1 and No. 2 Wells as proposed
by the AFEs and previously approved by Company A. These operations were necessary for the
continued production of hydrocarbons from these wells. Both the Gasser No. 1 and Gasser No. 2
Wells are producing from geologic zones such that they require monitoring and maintenance to
continue producing hydrocarbons.
12.

Company B assumed and continued the operations proposed and begun by Company C in

a good faith effort to maintain production in the Prospect and protect the interests of all of the
working interest owners, including Company A. Despite Company B’s good faith efforts to
operate the Prospect, Company A filed this lawsuit and has asked this Court to enjoin Company
B from continued operations in the Prospect.
13.

If Company B is ordered to cease all operations in the Prospect and no one is acting as

operator, then all of the working interest owners, including Company A, will be materially
injured. Without continued operations on the Gasser No. 3 Well, the working interest owners
risk losing some of the leases due to the continuous operations clauses in those leases. The
working interest owners would also not be in compliance with some of the lessors’ demands for
an offset well.

It is also possible that the well on Big Oil’s adjoining lease will drain the

hydrocarbons from under the Prospect. In addition, there will be considerable expenses resulting
from early termination of the drilling contract with Patterson UTI and temporarily plugging the
Well. Some or all of the expenses incurred in drilling the Gasser No. 3 Well thus far could be
wasted. Furthermore, the Gasser No. 1 and Gasser No. 2 Wells will be shut-in and not producing
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if no one is operating them. This would endanger additional leases in the Prospect, cause a loss
of revenue to all of the working interest owners, and place the efficient recovery of reserves in
jeopardy. In short, the Prospect cannot be without an operator.
LEGAL AUTHORITY
14.

In Texas, a court may appoint a receiver in an action between partners or others jointly

owning or interested in any property. Tex . Civ . Pra c . & Re m . Co d e § 64.001(a)(3). In such an
action, the party requesting the appointment of a receiver must have a probable interest or a right
in the property and the property must be in danger of being lost or materially injured. T ex . Civ .
Pr a c . & Re m . Code § 64.001(b). As will be detailed below, these factors are present and the
appointment of a receiver is necessary and justified.
THE COURT SHOULD APPOINT A RECEIVER TO OPERATE THE PROSPECT
15.

In the event that the Court enjoins Company B from conducting operations in the

Prospect, the Court should appoint a receiver to prevent the injury and damage to the Prospect
that would occur in the absence of an operator. The Court would be justified in doing so,
because all of the elements necessary for such a ruling have been fulfilled. This action is a
lawsuit between parties jointly owning property. Company B unquestionably has a probable
interest in or right to the property, because it is a working interest owner. Finally, the Prospect is
in danger of being materially injured.
16.

If the Prospect does not have an operator, then the Prospect and the rights of the working

interest owners will be substantially injured. The drilling of the Gasser No. 3 Well will be
stopped at considerable expense to the working interest owners. The cessation of this drilling
operation will put many of the leases in the Prospect in jeopardy of terminating. The Gasser No.
1 and No. 2 Wells will not be producing, thus endangering additional leases and depriving the
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working interest owners and future reserve recovery. As a result, the Prospect will be materially
injured in a manner that can be avoided only by the appointment of a receiver.
17.

When jointly owned mineral property is in danger of being lost or materially injured, a

receiver may be appointed to operate the property. Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer,
136 S.W.2d 800, 806-7 (Tex. 1940); United North & South Oil Co. v. Meredith, 272 S.W. 124,
125-26 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925); Boger v. Moore, 196 S.W.2d 646, 648-49 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Beaumont 1946, no writ); Chancellor v. Guerra, 85 S.W.2d 663, 664 (Tex. Civ. App.—San
Antonio 1935, no writ). In Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co., the parties were disputing the title to
half of the mineral interest in a tract of land. The defendants had taken possession of the tract
and were operating wells on it. They were preventing the plaintiffs from drilling any wells. The
trial court appointed a receiver, and the court of civil appeals certified questions to the Texas
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that a receiver was justified in this instance. In
reaching this decision, the Texas Supreme Court found that the circumstances “rendered
precarious the interest of appellees in said property and placed a portion of it in danger of being
removed and the remainder materially injured.” Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co., 136 S.W.2d at
807. Similarly, the interests of all of the working interest owners in the Prospect are in danger of
being injured if there is no operator. As in Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co., a receiver would be
justified.
18.

The parties were involved in a dispute over the cancellation of a lease and the partition of

several tracts of land in United North & South Oil Co.

The trial court had appointed

commissioners to partition the land, and one of the parties appealed from the judgment. While
the appeal was pending, all but one of the parties asked the court to appoint a receiver. United
North & South Oil Co., 272 S.W. at 124. The applicants alleged that producing wells on
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neighboring leases were draining the oil underneath their land.

The trial court granted the

application and appointed a receiver to arrange for the drilling of wells on the property. The
Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this decision.

The Commission on Appeals affirmed the

decisions of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals under the predecessor statute of Tex .
Civ. Pra c . & Rem . Co d e § 64.001. In doing so, the Commission on Appeals held:
In this case, showing having been made that without a receiver the mineral rights
in the land could not be developed on account of the refusal of the oil company to
cooperate in development, and its adverse claim, and that, unless a receiver
should be appointed, the oil and gas will be entirely, or in a large measure,
drained from under the land, the appointment of a receiver by the trial court was
warranted.
Id. at 126. Similarly, the hydrocarbons under the Prospect are in danger of being drained by at
least one well on an adjoining lease.

The appointment of a receiver would prevent such

drainage.
19.

In Boger, the court approved of a receiver when the parties disagreed on how to continue

the drilling of a well. Boger, 196 S.W.2d at 649. The plaintiff, an owner of oil and gas leases,
had contracted with the defendant to drill a well. The plaintiff was to contribute funds for the
drilling and assign the defendant interests in some of the leases. Id. at 646-47. A dispute arose
when the defendant asked for additional money for the drilling operations, and the plaintiff filed
suit. During the pendency of the suit, the trial court appointed a receiver to take over the well.
The defendant appealed from this decision. The Court of Civil Appeals reviewed the trial court’s
order and held:
The oil well at that stage of its drilling represented a considerable investment and
its value as such to both parties could have been lost or considerably depreciated
in value by lack of experienced attention. This care and attention to the needs of
the well was provided by the appointment of the receiver, whose further actions
are to be under the direction of the trial court in the interest of all parties
interested in the completion of the well. We think the facts as developed upon the
hearing amply warranted the court in its action.
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Id. at 649 (citing Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. and United North & South Well Co.). Therefore,
the appointment of the receiver was affirmed. Id. As in Boger, the well at the center of this
dispute, the Gasser No. 3, is at a stage such that it is a considerable investment for the working
interest owners and its value could be lost without further attention from an operator.
Consequently, a receiver is needed in the event the Court prohibits Company B from conducting
further operations on the Prospect.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
20.

If Company A succeeds in its efforts to have Company B enjoined from conducting

future operations in the Prospect, then there will be no operator for the Prospect. The result
would be a significant loss to Company A and all of the other working interest owners in the
Prospect. The Court should not allow all of the time and money put into this Prospect to go to
waste. To avoid loss and material injury to the Prospect, a receiver is needed. For all of these
reasons, the Court should appoint a receiver to operate the Prospect.
WHEREFORE, Company B respectfully requests that, if the Court enjoins Company B
from conducting operations in the Prospect, the Court grant this Application for the Appointment
of a Receiver, issue an Order setting the amount of the applicant’s bond, appoint a receiver to
operate the Prospect after a 30-day transition period, and grant such other and further relief to
which Company B may be justly entitled to receive.
Respectfully submitted,
Cot t on , Bled soe , T ig h e & Daw son , P.C.

9

